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A remarkable aspect of quantum theory is that certain measurement outcomes are entirely unpredictable
to all possible observers. Such quantum events can be harnessed to generate numbers whose randomness is
asserted based upon the underlying physical processes. We formally introduce, design, and experimentally
demonstrate an ultrafast optical quantum random number generator that uses a totally untrusted photonic
source. While considering completely general quantum attacks, we certify and generate in real time random
numbers at a rate of 8.05 Gb=s with a composable security parameter of 10−10. Composable security is the
most stringent and useful security paradigm because any given protocol remains secure even if arbitrarily
combined with other instances of the same, or other, protocols, thereby allowing the generated randomness
to be utilized for arbitrary applications in cryptography and beyond. This work achieves the fastest
generation of composably secure quantum random numbers ever reported.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent randomness of quantum theory, embodied
by Born’s rule, creates fundamentally unpredictable events.
The concept of a quantum random number generator
(QRNG) is to leverage this principle to produce a random,
unpredictable output with an unparalleled level of con-
fidence. The central challenge faced by practical QRNGs is
to rigorously quantify how much of the entropy generated
by a real-world device is indeed intrinsically unpredictable.
To sketch the basic idea, let us consider a device
completely described by parameters s which could be
quantum or classical. These are used to generate a classical
outcome X that should appear unpredictable from the
perspective of an agent external to the device. Consider
such an agent E with access to a system which includes all
the parameters s as well as any other side information
(classical or quantum). For any given value of s, the joint
system is described by a classical-quantum state ρ̂XE and







where the supremum is taken over all measurements fÊxg
made by E on the system, px is the probability distribution
of the random variable X, and ρ̂xE is the state of E
conditioned on X ¼ x. For a real device, however, s is
never known exactly. In this case, a conservative estimate
of the predictability is given by P ¼ maxs Pideal;sðXjEÞ,
where the maximization is taken over all plausible param-
eters s. Confidence in the randomness is thus linked to
claims about trusted workings of the device and subsequent
constraints on the knowledge of the external agent.
Approaches to QRNGs differ by the detail with which
the devices need to be characterized in order to constrain s
[1,2]. Perhaps the simplest conceptually is a so-called
device-independent QRNG, which can take the form of
a Bell test [3–6]. In this case, the device must be composed
of two isolated measurements that employ independently
selected bases—a requirement that can be verified with
high confidence. With this condition, P < 1 as long as the
measurement outcomes violate a Bell inequality, which in
turn constrain the plausible s [7]. In reality, however, even
state-of-the-art implementations [8] are extremely complex
and yield impractical bit rates of the order ∼10 b=s. An
alternate approach is to build a QRNG in which the
entire device, from quantum source to measurement, is
faithfully characterized and modeled [9]. Here, the detailed
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characterization, which might use both off-line and in-line
measurements, crucially constrains s (and thus E) suffi-
ciently to assert a nonunit P. As such, this seemingly
exhaustive type of characterization of the setup, and hence
trust in its proper inner workings, opens up a myriad of
potential attacks and malfunctions which might compro-
mise the randomness output.
A series of intermediate approaches have appeared,
commonly referred to as having partial device-independ-
ence, which yield a QRNG that permits abstraction from
some of the devices while needing a detailed characteri-
zation of the remainder. These can be broadly classified as
those that are independent of the measurement devices
[10–12] or the sources [13]. A third class, known as semi-
device-independent, makes no assumptions on either the
source or measurements except to assert a global constraint
on the relevant dimension [14,15], energy [16], or ortho-
gonality of the relevant states [17]. Finally, other works
have combined assumptions, such as the semi-source-
independent protocols (originally thought to be fully source
independent) that invoke a dimension assumption in con-
junction with a calibrated detection [18–20]. These latter
works exemplify the critical point that when analyzing
partially device-independent protocols, it is important to
keep track of the interaction between trusted, but imperfect,
devices and the certification techniques used to prove
security against deviations in the untrusted components.
Successful design of a practical QRNG must balance
confidence with ease of implementation, achievable bit rate,
durability, and cost. For example, QRNGs based on radio-
active decay have limited bit rates, whereas those utilizing
electronic noise require careful distinction of quantum and
thermal fluctuations [1]. In contrast, optical QRNGs prom-
ise well-isolated quantum systems along with speed and
technical ease. Implementations have been based on photon
welcher weg [21–23], photon arrival time [24,25], photon
number statistics [26], vacuum fluctuations [27–31], phase
noise [32–34], and Raman scattering [35,36].
In this paper, we develop a certification of quantum
randomness generated by an optical beam splitter for which
one input field is the vacuum and the other is completely
unknown. The certification was carried out in real time
using an additional vacuum mode to tap off part of the
unknown light source prior to the randomness generation.
This method probabilistically infers a lower bound on the
photon number of the remaining untrusted source imping-
ing onto the randomness generation measurement. We
show that signals from carefully characterized photodetec-
tors, which need not resolve photon number, are sufficient
to both generate and certify genuine quantum randomness.
Our approach results in a composably secure protocol
and we provide an explicit security proof for high-speed
quantum randomness expansion. Such a proof is necessary
for all applications that wish to claim provable quantum-
based security. A key or random string only becomes useful
in composition with other protocols (one-time pad, hash-
ing, etc.) such that in order to retain provable quantum
security, a composable proof is mandatory. To date, most
randomness generation protocols fail to provide outputs
that are useable in a composable framework, with, to our
knowledge, only a handful shown to be composably secure
in a device-dependent scenario [9,37,38] and only one
partially device-independent result [13].
To experimentally demonstrate our scheme, we used
off-the-shelf components—a laser source, high band-
width photodiodes, basic linear optical elements, and a
high-performance field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
board—and generated random numbers with a bit rate of
8.05 Gb=s and a composable security parameter ϵ ¼ 10−10.
Overall, our framework is compatible with a wide range of
optical detectors and avoids the need to trust or precisely
characterize the source of light, as opposed to conventional
vacuum homodyning wherein a trusted photonic source is a
necessity.
II. GENERATING RANDOMNESS FROM
UNTRUSTED LIGHT
In Eq. (1), we quantified the randomness of an out-
come X for an external agent E. As is common in
quantum cryptography, we refer to this agent as Eve the
eavesdropper. An equivalent, but more convenient, way of
quantifying this randomness is to compute the quantum
conditional min-entropy of the quantum state ρ̂XE for the
joint system XE [39],









where the argument of the logarithm is the guessing
probability for Eve to guess X, as in Eq. (1). This quantity
has been shown to quantify the number of bits—almost
perfectly random with respect to Eve—that can be
extracted via postprocessing [40]. Notice the distinction
between a quantum randomness generator (QRG) which
simply generates outputs with a certain conditional min-
entropy and a QRNG that also includes the postprocessing
(hashing) necessary to produce almost perfect random
numbers. This is worth mentioning because many results
in the literature only implement the randomness generation
without carrying out random number extraction in real
time. Note also that only by composably certifying the
randomness generation process can the security of the
extracted numbers be rigorously established.
A certified randomness generation protocol allows for
some, or all, devices to deviate arbitrarily from their
purported specifications. A certification test P is applied
to the experimental data and only upon that test passing is
the output certified as having a certain amount of random-
ness, otherwise it is discarded. Furthermore, a useful
generator will be robust; i.e., it will pass the test with high
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probability. Formally, we can define such a protocol as
follows.
Definition 1.—An (m; κ; ϵfail;m; ϵc)-certified randomness
generation protocol produces an output X made of m
measurement results such that
(i) Security: Either the certification test P fails, or
HminðXjEÞ ≥ κ;
except with probability ϵfail;m.
(ii) Completeness: There exists an honest implementa-
tion such that the test will be passed with proba-
bility 1 − ϵc.
This security definition is composable, which ensures
several crucial properties for cryptographic applications.
Firstly, any two protocols that have been proven to satisfy
Definition 1 except with failure probabilities ε1 and ε2 can
be composed into a joint protocol with a total security
parameter ε ≤ ε1 þ ε2. Just as importantly, if a single string
is divided in two, the security of one part remains unchanged
even if the other part’s security has been compromised. Note
that this situation often occurs by design, whereby some part
of a random string is subsequently publicly revealed (e.g., if
it was used to generate lotto numbers or to encrypt
information that is announced at a later date).
We define our source-device-independent (SDI) pho-
tonic QRG as a protocol in which detectors and passive
optical devices (e.g., beam splitters) are taken to be trusted.
Photonic states are generated via a laser as input to the
experiment (essentially preparing a large amplitude coher-
ent state); however, in the analysis, we will not assume
anything about the state of these photons and in that sense
we claim that randomness is generated in an SDI manner.
Crucially, however, we also assume that it is possible to
exploit a trusted vacuum mode. One might point out that
this is in fact assuming at least one trusted source, namely
the vacuum. Nevertheless, we argue that vacuum is a rather
privileged source in the sense that it does not really require
a “device” to be generated, merely the ability to block an
input port to a beam splitter. Thus, it would seem highly
preferable from a security perspective to trust a vacuum
source rather than some photonic state created by a
sophisticated device such as a laser or spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion process. We also emphasize that
the detection process here is distinct from a homodyne
detection in that the incoming state is mixed with a vacuum
mode instead of a local oscillator (large amplitude coherent
state). Even more importantly, we model our measurements
directly as opposed to the homodyne protocols [18–20]
which model this detection as a quadrature measurement.
This is rather at odds with the goal of being SDI because
that is only approximately true in the limit where one
assumes that the input signal has far fewer photons than the
local oscillator. In Sec. VI and Appendix G, we will also
discuss how our measurement scheme has different, and in
many cases, superior scalings of the certifiable randomness
rates than standard homodyne based protocols.
To gain some intuition, let us start by considering the
randomness generation measurement depicted in Fig. 1. It
consists of a beam splitter BS0 with reflectivity r0 ¼ 12, an
input mode R, a trusted vacuum fed into the other input
mode, and two output photodetectors A and B performing a
differencemeasurement. Assuming the photodetectors to be
perfect, we can model them as performing a single meas-
urement acting on the untrusted photonic randomness
source in mode R. The outcomes of the measurement will
be the photon numbers nA and nB detected by detectors A
and B, respectively. Propagating this detection event back
through the beam splitter and using our knowledge about the
trusted vacuum mode, this measurement is then associated





jnA þ nBihnA þ nBjR; ð3Þ
living in the Hilbert space of the input mode R (see
Appendix A for details).
Given this, we now propose a simple certifiable random-
ness generation protocol. It consists of recording the value
of the photon number sum N ≔ nA þ nB and then using the
difference measurement x ≔ nA − nB as the source of
randomness. Therefore, we have two measurements: one
of N and one of x. The POVM Z has elements ẐðNÞ for the




M̂ðnA; N − nBÞR
¼ jNihNjR: ð4Þ
FIG. 1. Scheme for our SDI protocol. An unknown light source
ρ̂E is mixed with a trusted vacuum on a beam splitter (BS) with
reflectivity r1 to perform a certification measurement. The mea-
sured outcome at detector C is subject to a test P that passes if the
outcome lies within a certain range ½n−C; nþC . Upon passing the test,
we certify a photon number nR in mode R that impinges onto the
randomness generation measurement except with probability ϵfail.
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On the other hand, as we show in Appendix A, the









× j2nA − jxjih2nA − jxjjR: ð5Þ
We already see the inherent randomness of this scheme
since X̂ðxÞ has support over the whole Fock space.
Therefore, for any state in mode R with total photon
number N > 0, there will be multiple possible values x
which can occur. Moreover, there is a manifest independ-
ence from the photonic input state. Because the measure-
ments described by ẐðNÞ and X̂ðxÞ are by definition
compatible, we can always think of the ẐðNÞ measurement
happening first and projecting onto the state jNi, which will
subsequently produce randomness when measured with X.
Thus, conditioned upon observing a sum value of N, one
would certify with probability ϵfail;m ¼ 0 an amount of
randomness that scales as log2ðNπ=2Þ, for large N, as per
Definition 1 and shown in Appendix A.
Now, consider the full setup shown in Fig. 1. We
introduce the certification measurement in mode C which
is done by tapping off a fraction of the completely unknown
incoming light in mode E with a beam splitter BS1 of
reflectivity r1. The input state ρ̂E is mixed with a trusted
vacuum on BS1 and the reflected beam in mode C is
measured at detector C while the transmitted beam in mode
R is input to the randomness generation measurement. This
idea is superficially similar to the “energy test” proposed in
the context of device-dependent continuous variable quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [41]. This test also taps off a
portion of the incoming mode but instead uses a trusted and
ideal heterodyne detection for the certification measure-
ment. Such a scheme is a priori forbidden in an SDI context
(a trusted photonic source being necessary for a heterodyne
detection) and, as we show in Appendix B, also fails to
provide any security for realistic finite-range detectors.
Our test P is applied to the output of detector C with the
protocol aborting if the result lies outside a range ½n−C; nþC .
Upon passing the test, we obtain a certificate that nR, the
photon number in mode R, lies within a range ½n−R; nþR 
except with some failure probability ϵfail. Then, by mini-
mizing the min-entropy over all states within this range, we
obtain a certified lower bound on the generated random-
ness. For this idealised scenario, we could allow nþR to be
unbounded and would simply look to certify the largest
possible value of n−R given a specific ϵfail.
III. CERTIFYING RANDOMNESS WITH
REALISTIC DEVICES
In a real experiment, several further complications must
be taken into account. Even in a scenario of completely
trusted and calibrated devices, care must be taken to
quantify the amount of randomness that can be credibly
claimed to have been generated. Firstly, real detectors only
possess a finite dynamic range over which their response is
meaningful. Secondly, measurement outcomes are coarse
grained to a finite resolution which must be carefully
accounted for when determining the output randomness.
Finally, noisy devices will exhibit fluctuations due to
processes not under complete experimental control.
Information about these processes might be accessible to
external observers and, even if not, could certainly be
stemming from physical processes that are far from
random. Nevertheless, this can be accounted for provided
the device noise is calibrated and not controlled by Eve.
This makes the noise essentially classical, in the sense that
we may assume that it is described by variables λ which are
distributed according to a characterized probability distri-
bution. These variables are then given to Eve on a shot-by-
shot basis.
Consequently, the first step for analyzing our experiment
is to carefully calibrate and model the realistic photodiodes,
which output noisy voltage measurements rather than exact
photon numbers. More formally, following the approach of
Ref. [42], we model the POVM describing our noisy,
characterized measurements as a projective measurement
on a larger system. For the case of our detectors (see Fig. 6
in Appendix B for a cohesive summary), the measured
voltages are modeled as follows. First, we consider an L ≔
nmax − nmin þ 1 outcome photon number resolving meas-
urement with a finite range ½nmin; nmax described by
measurement operators that are number state projectors
(i.e., N̂ðnÞ ¼ jnihnj), except for the first and last opera-





n¼nmax jnihnj. This photon number is con-
verted to a voltage via a conversion factor α and is then
smeared by an additional Gaussian noise term λ of known
variance σ2. Note that, in principle, the conversion factor α
representing the voltage response of the detector need not
be constant over time. Indeed, as evidenced in Appendix B,
this fact potentially leads to major security loopholes unless
appropriate narrow spectral filtering is applied. Such filter-
ing is straightforward for narrow band sources, but prob-
lematic for the more commonly used pulsed lasers as it
significantly reduces the output number of photons. Finally,
the voltage signal is coarse grained by a b-bit analog-to-
digital converter (ADC) that itself has only finite range
½Vmin; Vmax and finite resolution of 2b bins. However,
to correctly quantify the randomness associated with each
b-bit measurement, it is essential for one to consider ΔADC,
the ADC’s effective number of bits (ENOB). Indeed, it
corresponds to the amount of bits free of internal electronic
noise. This effective bit depth leads to an effective voltage
resolution δV ¼ ðVmax − VminÞ=2ΔADC . The output of such a
realistic measurement is an index, say j, corresponding
to a voltage bin of width δV centered at jδV. We can
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therefore associate minimum and maximum voltages vj ¼
δVðj 1
2
Þ with this outcome j.
The certification measurement is made by mixing the
unknown photonic input ρ̂E in mode E with vacuum j0i on
a beam splitter of reflectivity r1. The reflected mode C is
then detected with a noisy photodiode (characterized by
noise standard deviation σC and voltage conversion factor
αC) that is coarse grained by an ADC. The protocol aborts
for sufficiently large or small observed voltages (P is now a
test applied directly to the measured voltage index). Finally,
the randomness is generated by mixing the transmitted state
in mode R with another vacuum on a beam splitter with
reflectivity r0 ¼ 12 and making a coarse-grained, noisy
difference measurement characterized by noise standard
deviation σD and voltage conversion factor αD. As with the
ideal case, we can write the measurements as operators in
the input Hilbert space. As shown in Appendix B, the
POVM element for a realistic voltage difference measure-














where X̂finðxÞ are the POVM elements of a difference
measurement that is identical to Eq. (5) except that it is
made with finite-range photodetectors described above and
is hence only operationally equivalent over an input photon
number range ½nDmin; nDmax.
Similarly, the certification measurement element corre-














With this detection model in hand, we state our main
theorem as follows.
Theorem 1.—An optical setup consisting of
(i) two trusted vacuum modes
(ii) two beam splitters of reflectivity r0 ¼ 12 and r1
(iii) two noisy photodetectors used to make a difference
measurement as described in Eq. (6)
(iv) a third noisy photodetector used to make a certif-
ication measurement as described in Eq. (8) which
passes the test P if i falls in a chosen range ½i−; iþ
can be used as a certified ðm; κ; ϵfail;m; ϵcÞ-randomness
generation protocol as per Definition 1 without making
any assumptions about the photonic source with



























with δV ¼ ðVmax − VminÞ=2ΔADC ,
ϵfail;m ≤ mϵfail; ð12Þ
where





























where noptE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1, nþR is set to be the saturating
photon number of the difference measurement, and λ̃ is a
bound on λC, the noise variable of the certification measure-
ment’s detector, such that jλCj < λ̃ except with probability ελC.
Moreover,







using a coherent state jαi as an input.
Proof sketch.—For a complete proof, see Appendix C.
The protocol consists of m rounds, each of which are
defined as a certification measurement subjected to the test
P and a randomness measurement sample that is registered
in X. One part of the proof is to show that, for any given
round of the protocol, conditioned on passing the testP, the
state in mode R has support in the photon number basis that
lies almost entirely in the range ½n−R; nþR . More concretely,
we maximize over all possible input states to upper bound
ϵfail ≔ max
ρ̂E
Prði− ≤ i ≤ iþ ∧ nR ∉ ½n−R; nþR Þ; ð16Þ
the joint probability that the test would be passed in mode C
while a photon number outside the range ½n−R; nþR  was
present in mode R. This quantity can be interpreted as the
probability that the conditional state in mode R can be
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operationally distinguished from any state solely supported
within ½n−R; nþR  (see Appendix D).
The secondpart of theproof is to optimizeover all possible
input states with support only in ½n−R; nþR  to derive a lower
boundon theconditionalmin-entropy.Note thatapriori,Eve
has the freedom to choose an input state that is potentially
entangled across all m rounds; i.e., we are considering
completely general, so-called coherent attacks. Together,
these results mean that either the min-entropy for a single
roundwill be lower boundedor the protocolwill abort except
with probability ϵfail. Form rounds, one can simply add these
lower bounds together to bound the min-entropy of the
output concatenated string except with a probability
ϵfail;m ≔ 1 − ð1 − ϵfailÞm ≤ mϵfail; ð17Þ
as claimed in Eq. (12).
Intuitively, onewouldexpect thatEve’s optimal strategy to
predict the outcomeof a differencemeasurementwouldbe to
input a pure Fock state and this is indeed the case. The key
fact is that the realistic difference measurement is still
diagonal in the photon number basis and that an m-round
protocol can be described as a tensor product of such
measurements. Note that for the purposes of calculating
the min-entropy, we consider the difference measurement in
Eq. (6) from the perspective of Eve who knows the noise
variable λD on a shot-by-shot basis, for which
V̂ΔADCD ðjÞ ¼
P
x∈X X̂ðxÞ, where X ¼ fx∶αDxþ λD ∈ IDj g.
The fact that this measurement commutes with a diagonal-
izing map in the photon number basis makes it straightfor-
ward to show that Eve’s optimal guessing probability is
achieved by inputting a pure Fock state. Providedwe choose
nþR less than nmax, the saturation value for the detectors, then
direct calculation shows that the guessing probability
decreases monotonically in nR. Thus, for states restricted
to ½n−R; nþR , the smallestmin-entropy is achievedby inputting
jn−Ri. Finally, the fact that the coefficients in Eq. (5) are those
of abinomial distribution canbeused to show thatEve’smin-
entropy is minimized whenever x is minimal (0 or 1
depending if an odd or even photon number is input) and
λD ¼ 0. Assuming that this is always the case, direct
evaluation of trfjn−Rihn−RjV̂ΔADCD ðn−R mod 2Þg yields the
expression in Eq. (10).
Turning to the failure probability, we first define a failure
operator which corresponds to taking the failure condition
(i.e., a passing voltage is observed at detector C along with
nR ∉ ½n−R; nþR  in mode R) and write it as an operator in the
Hilbert space of Eve’s input mode:




rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
× jnC þ nRihnC þ nRjE; ð18Þ
where C ¼ fnC∶αCnC þ λC ∈ ½i−; iþg.
Since this operator is also diagonal in the photon number
basis, one can repeat the previous arguments to show that
Eve’s optimal strategy to maximize this failure probability
is also achieved by a Fock state.
The failure probability for a single round of the protocol





hnEjV̂σC;ΔADCF ði; n−R; nþR ÞjnEi. ð19Þ
To bound this quantity, we first use our knowledge of the
certification noisevariable λC. Exceptwith probability ϵλC ¼
1 − erfðλ̃= ffiffiffi2p σCÞ, we know that jλCj ≤ λ̃. Substituting
Eq. (18) in Eq. (19) yields two terms as the sum over nR ∉
½n−R; nþR  decomposes as a sum for 0 ≤ nR < n−R and
nþR < nR ≤ ∞. Provided we have λC ≤ v
þ
iþ − αCðnþR−
n−R þ 1Þ, then there is no value of nE for which both terms
will be simultaneously nonzero and we can write
ϵfail ¼ maxfϵ−; ϵþg þ ϵλC ; ð20Þ
where ϵ− (ϵþ) corresponds to the lower (upper) sum.
Both of these are essentially cumulative binomial dis-





rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
; ð21Þ
where n−C is the smallest photon number allowed at mode C
consistent with passing the test.
For unbounded λC, it would be impossible to determine
n−C or ϵ−, but again using λ̃, we can do so except with
probability ϵλC. If we define v
−ðþÞ
i as the minimum
(maximum) voltage compatible with the passing range
½i−; iþ, we can obtain a minimum (maximum) photon
number n−C ¼ ðv−i − λ̃Þ=αC (nþC ¼ ðvþi þ λ̃Þ=αC) for mode
C compatible with passing the test. The varying lower limit
on the sum in Eq. (21) stems from the fact that for Eve to
cheat, there are two constraints on nC. First, it must be the
case that a sufficiently large number of photons go to
detector C such that the test is passed, but for sufficiently
large nE this condition is superseded by the requirement
that less than n−R photons go to mode R. Arguments based
on the nature of the binomial coefficients allow us to show
that to maximize ϵ−, Eve should choose the input state
noptE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1. This can be directly substituted into
Eq. (21) to obtain ϵ− as per Eq. (14) and an analogous
argument can be applied to bound the corresponding ϵþ. In
combination with Eqs. (17) and (20), this completes the
security proof. ▪
Finally, as elucidated in Appendix C, the application of
Hoeffding’s bound yields more convenient expressions for
direct evaluation of the failure probabilities in Eq. (14).
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IV. EXTRACTING RANDOM NUMBERS FROM
CERTIFIED QUANTUM RANDOMNESS
Finally, we turn to the task of actually extracting ϵ-secure
random numbers for use in real-world applications. This
can be achieved via two-universal hashing (detailed in
Appendix E) which can be efficiently implemented using
an FPGA. The details of the randomness extraction are
critical in determining both the final speed and security of
the QRNG. Firstly, one must obtain a composable certifi-
cate for how close the hashed outputs are to perfect
randomness. Secondly, one needs to assess whether the
randomness extraction is performed in real time, i.e., at a
rate greater than or equal to the randomness generation rate
posed by the experiment. To precisely address these issues,
the critical parameters are the FPGA’s hashing speed
(number of hashes per second) and the hashing block size.
Regarding the composable security definition for the
final hashed numbers, we can simply adopt the following
standard secrecy criteria from the QKD literature [43].
Definition 2.—Let X be the random variable describing
the measurements of a certified QRG protocol which
succeeds with probability ppass and let S denote the result
of a randomness extraction process applied to X. The result
S is ϵ secure if ρ̂SE, the joint state with the eavesdropper,
satisfies
ppassDðρ̂SE; ρ̂idealÞ ≤ ϵ; ð22Þ
where Dðρ̂; σ̂Þ ≔ 1
2
jjρ̂ − σ̂jj1 is the trace distance and ρ̂ideal
is the output of an ideal randomness source, defined as
ρ̂ideal ≔ τ̂S ⊗ ρ̂E, with τ̂S the uniformly distributed state
on S.
Because of the composable nature of our randomness
generation protocol, we can apply previous results on
hashing with quantum side information [44] to obtain
the desired certificate in Eq. (22). Its precise formulation
is given by the theorem below (see Appendix E for a full
derivation).
Theorem 2.—A certified SDI ðm; κ; ϵfail;m; ϵcÞ-random-
ness generation protocol as defined in Definition 1 can be
processed with a random seed of length m via two-
universal hashing to produce a certified SDI random string
of length l given by




that is ϵc complete and εl secure, where ϵl ¼ ϵhash þ ϵfail;m
secure.
To understand how such a system will perform, we
examine these security parameters in more detail beginning
with ϵhash. Inverting Eq. (23), ϵhash is expressed as
ϵhash ¼ 2ðl−κ−2Þ=2: ð24Þ
The raw data output by an m-round QRG protocol will
be a bit string of length h ¼ mb, where b is the total
number of bits recorded by the ADC for each measurement
(recall that this is different fromΔADC, the effective number
of noise-free bits that we used to lower bound the random-
ness). From Theorem 1, we know that the total min-entropy
is proportional to the number of rounds, or alternatively the
block length, and so we can write κ ¼ g0m ¼ ðg0=bÞh ≔ gh
for some constants g and g0. The extracted length can also
be written in terms of a compression ratio r defined by
l ¼ r × h. Putting this together, we can rewrite Eq. (24) as
ϵhash ¼ 2−ðh=2Þðg−r−2Þ: ð25Þ
To see the critical importance of the block size h,
consider the case of maximal compression. For fixed h,
there is a hard lower limit to the compression ratio given by
r ≥ 1=h, since the minimum possible output length is 1 bit.
This in turn necessitates a lower limit ϵhash ≥ 2−ðhg−3Þ=2 and
hence a limit on the total achievable ϵl. This shows that a
certain minimum block size is mandatory to obtain a given
level of security. More generally, considering Eq. (25), it
becomes clear that increasing h allows us to either increase
the compression ratio while keeping ϵhash constant (i.e.,
linearly improving performance while maintaining
security) or decrease ϵhash while keeping r constant
(i.e., exponentially improving security while maintaining
performance).
There is a further consideration in that augmenting the
block size h (i.e., taking more measurement samplesm) has
the deleterious effect of increasing the value of ϵfail;m. This
can be compensated by either altering the voltage thresh-
olds used in the test P at the cost of a decreased probability
of passing the test 1 − ϵc or inferring a smaller certified
minimum photon number and hence a smaller min-entropy
κ. This in turn feeds back into ϵhash. Nevertheless, although
one cannot arbitrarily increase h, in practice it turns out that
having a sufficiently large block size is imperative for
maximizing the overall performance of a QRNG setup. If
the min-entropy per measurement is relatively low, then as
per Eq. (25) and the discussion above, a small h prohibits
any randomness extraction whatsoever. As well as this in-
principle limitation, in practice, the maximum achievable
block size h is typically limited by the technical parameters
of the FPGA used for postprocessing.
Therefore, depending upon the desired application, one
may need to concatenate several blocks of hashed random
numbers to obtain a final string of the requisite length.
Intuitively, it should be possible to deliver shorter strings at
a faster bit rate, given that less concatenation is required
and hence worse security per hashed output string of length
l can be tolerated. Defining t to be the number of output
l-bit concatenated blocks, one obtains a final string of the
desired length L ¼ t × l ¼ t × r × h with an overall secu-
rity parameter ϵ given by
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ϵ ¼ tϵl ≥ tðϵhash þmϵfailÞ; ð26Þ
as per Eqs. (17) and (E10).
One can now readily observe that for a fixed final ϵ, a
smaller number of concatenations t would allow a larger
value for ϵfail and ϵhash, which in turn permits a larger
compression ratio r and thus a faster overall bit rate.
Turning to the final bit rate, there are two cases,
depending upon whether it is the FPGA or the experiment
itself which is the bottleneck. Consider the case when the
hashing speed is slower than the experiment’s output data
generation rate. Define Rhash as the FPGA clock rate (i.e.,
the inverse of the time it takes to carry out one hashing
operation). Since each hashing operation outputs l bits, the
total bit rate is
Rh ≔ Rhash × l ¼ Rhash × r × h; ð27Þ
where the subscript h denotes that the limiting time factor is
the hashing speed.
The second case, which will hold for our real-time
implementation, is when the experiment is slower than the
hashing. Given an experimental data acquisition rate of
Rdata, the total bit rate will simply be
Rd ≔ Rdata × r; ð28Þ
where the subscript d denotes that this time, it is the data
acquisition rate which is the limiting factor.
Ultimately, given that an honest implementation of the
QRNG protocol passes with probability 1 − ϵc, the aver-
aged generated bit rate is
hRi ¼ ð1 − ϵcÞ × minfRh; Rdg; ð29Þ
where the minimum discriminates between the two pos-
sible cases described above.
V. EXPERIMENT
The experiment carries out two separate key tasks: the
randomness generation and the real-time extraction of
random numbers.
The experimental setup is displayed in Fig. 2 and
consists of a fully fiber-connected architecture with com-
mercially available components for the randomness gen-
eration and a high-speed field-programmable gate array for
random number extraction. Note that for the randomness
generation experiment, measurement signals will be ana-
lyzed with an oscilloscope in order to precisely characterize
the randomness found in each measurement while the real-
time extraction of random numbers will be faithfully
performed on a dedicated high-performance postprocessing
board containing both an ADC and an FPGA.
A. Randomness generation
The light source utilized is a continuous-wave (cw) laser
(Koheras Adjustik E15) at telecom wavelength
λ ¼ 1550 nm. Note that the source’s linewidth is less than
100 Hz, thereby ensuring it to be extremely narrow band.
The laser output is directed onto a fiber optical isolator
(Thorlabs IO-H-1550APC) in order to prevent unwanted
back reflections into the laser. A fiber optical variable
attenuator (model MAP-220CX-A from JDSU) is used to
generate different photon numbers impinging onto the
QRG by varying the laser’s optical power. The certifica-
tion and randomness generation measurements are imple-
mented using standard fiber couplers (Thorlabs 10202A
optimized for telecom wavelength) with reflectivities r1 ¼
0.0965 (i.e., ≈90∶10) and r0 ¼ 12 (i.e., 50∶50), respectively.
Detector C—used for the certification measurement—is a
fiber-coupled InGaAs PIN photodiode (Thorlabs
DET08CFC/M) with a large bandwidth BWC ¼ 5 GHz,
a responsitivity ηC ¼ 1.04 AW−1 at λ ¼ 1550 nm, a tran-
simpedance gain GC ¼ 50 Ω, and a measured electronic
noise with standard deviation σC ≈ 0.25 mV. On the other
hand, the randomness generation measurement made of
detectors A and B is implemented by means of a fiber-
coupled ac-coupled balanced detector (Thorlabs PDB-
480C-AC) with the following corresponding specifications:
BWD ¼ 1.6 GHz, ηD ¼ 0.95 AW−1 at λ¼1550nm,GD ¼
16000 Ω, and σD ≈ 3.05 mV. Signals from the detectors
are sampled by an oscilloscope (Lecroy WaveRunner
204MXi) with a 2 GHz bandwidth, a sampling rate of
FS ¼ 10 GS=s, and a voltage resolution of Vmax − Vmin ¼
10 mV=div. The measurements are recorded by the oscil-
loscope’s ADC as an 8-bit output, but with a calibrated bit
depth of ΔADC ¼ 4.772 bits. This corresponds to the
effective number of bits free of ADC internal noise. A
total of 24 datasets were acquired, scanning the optical
power input to the difference measurement from 0 to
6.77 mW, corresponding to the balanced detector’s linearity
response range. Each dataset was acquired over T ¼ 1 ms,
yielding 107 samples per power setting.
FIG. 2. Schematic of the setup used for random number
generation. Measurements generated by the fiber-connected
optical elements are fed to an ADC coupled to an FPGA. VATT,
variable optical attenuator; PD, photodiode; ADC, analog-to-
digital converter; FPGA, field-programmable gate array.
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To evaluate the certified randomness of this data for a
desired failure probability ϵfail, we must first fix λ̃ such that
ϵλC < ϵfail (here we choose ϵλC ¼ ϵfail=2). Then, given the
difference measurement’s saturation power, we set nþR
equal to the corresponding saturating photon number
nDmax ¼ 1.06 × 107 and choose an upper voltage threshold
viþ in Eq. (14) such that ϵþ < ϵfail=2. Finally, for a given
lower voltage threshold vi− , we solve Eq. (14) to find n
−
R
such that ϵ− ¼ ϵfail=2. This ensures that the photon number
input to the difference measurement lies within ½n−R; nþR 
except with probability maxfϵ−; ϵþg þ ϵλC ¼ ϵ− þ ϵλC ¼
ϵfail and the certified randomness can then be determined by
plugging n−R into Eq. (10) to retrieve the conditional min-
entropy.
This establishes the protocol’s SDI security as per
Definition 1. However, to understand how much random-
ness we can expect to obtain in practice, we should also
consider the protocol’s completeness. Typically, we will
have some claimed specifications for the source and can
choose thresholds accordingly. We would normally only
attempt to certify a quantity and quality of randomness such
that the corresponding test P would be passed with high
probability by a source satisfying the claimed specifications
using Eq. (15). Here, for simplicity, for each input power,
we will only allow ourselves to apply thresholds such that
all 107 measured samples pass the test.
In Fig. 3, the certified minimum photon number n−R in
mode R is plotted against the input optical power for
various security parameters ϵfail. The input power was
scanned across the linear range of the balanced detector,
with the voltage thresholds (vi) at each power setting
constrained such that all samples passed the test P. Under
these constraints, we chose a voltage threshold within the
range 0 to 39.2 mV. As can be seen, the certified photon
number scales linearly with the input power and vanishes
for sufficiently small or large photonic inputs. For small
powers, n−R goes to zero as no positive solution for Eq. (14)
with the required ϵ− can be found. This is as expected given
that, when a low photon number impinges onto detector C,
one cannot discern the produced voltage from the detector’s
inherent electronic noise. Alternatively, for large powers,
one can easily achieve a small value for ϵ− but it now is not
possible to obtain a value of ϵþ such that the total
certification is valid for ϵfail. This is also to be expected
as one approaches the balanced detector’s saturating power.
Finally, for increasing security (i.e., smaller ϵfail), n−R
decreases for a given input power and remains positive
over a smaller range of inputs. Indeed, the penultimate data
point is nonzero only for ϵfail ≥ 10−20 and no photon
number can be certified with any security for the final point.
The main result of this new SDI framework is shown in
Fig. 4, for which a comparison is made between the
experimentally estimated min-entropy, various device-
dependent (DD) min-entropymodels, and our SDI approach.
The red data points are experimental estimates of the
unconditional min-entropy for different average input
powers of the laser. These have been calculated from
histograms of the difference measurement (shown as inset
to Fig. 4) output by the balanced detector. Given these












FIG. 3. Certified minimum photon number n−R in mode R
plotted against input optical power for various security param-
eters ϵfail. Voltage thresholds used in the test P are constrained
such that all samples pass.














FIG. 4. Comparison between different min-entropy models.
The red data points are the experimentally estimated min-
entropies for different optical powers. These are obtained from
the difference measurement’s voltage histograms shown in the
inset (the voltage bins have been artificially thickened by a factor
of 10 to make the figure comprehensible). Error bars for the data
points have been included with the vertical component arising
from the precision of the histogram’s Gaussian fit and the
horizontal error showing the electronic noise’s contribution of
detector C when measuring the optical power. HDDminðXÞ (red) and
HDDminðXjEÞ (pink) are the device-dependent (DD) min-entropy
models unconditioned and conditioned on Eve’s knowledge of
the noise. HSDIminðXjEÞ (green, orange and blue) are our SDI
estimations of the conditional min-entropy plotted against the
input optical powers and for various security parameters ϵfail.
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histograms, a Gaussian fit was performed and the retrieved
maximum probability pmax was used to estimate the
unconditional min-entropy via Hmin ¼ −log2ðpmaxÞ. This
corresponds to a naive analysis where all observed fluc-
tuations are assumed to be truly random. The red line is a
device-dependent prediction for HDDminðXÞ, calculated using
our detector model and assuming that the laser is well
modeled by a coherent state jαi. The resulting curve
matches the data well with a coefficient of determination
R2 ¼ 98.96%, thereby confirming the validity of our
modelling. In pink, HDDminðXjEÞ corresponds to the usual
device-dependent conditional min-entropy, assuming a
known source but accounting for Eve’s knowledge of
the electronic noise present in our measurement apparatus.
As such, it is equal toHDDminðXÞ but shifted down by the min-
entropy associated with the electronic noise of the balanced
detector. Finally, in green, orange, and blue points, we
show our SDI model for the certified conditional min-
entropy HSDIminðXjEÞ for different values of the security
parameter ϵfail. These were calculated via Eq. (10) using the
minimum certified photon numbers n−R displayed in Fig. 3
for each ϵfail.
When comparing the different min-entropies in Fig. 4, it
is clear that the claimed level of randomness critically
depends on what assumptions are made about the QRG.
Indeed, if one were to naively take HDDminðXÞ as a consistent
min-entropy model, the QRG’s output would consequently
be predictable since the electronic noise can be accessible
to Eve. On the other hand, while HDDminðXjEÞ correctly
removes such classical side information, it nevertheless is a
device-dependent model for which the experimentalist
must trust the proper working of the entire setup, having
carefully modeled it and its possible deviations. This means
that such a scheme must be secure against all sorts of
complicated attacks from Eve. In the canonical setup of
Fig. 2, a key origin of experimental complexity arises from
the input light source. Our approach provides total inde-
pendence from such complexity while still certifying a
substantial amount of min-entropy per measurement as well
as an explicit quantification of its confidence given by ϵfail.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, we certify up to ≈1.1 bit of min-
entropy with ϵfail ¼ 10−20 for the penultimate data point.
While this value is about half of what HDDminðXjEÞ predicts,
we argue that such compromise is reasonable given that we
can still achieve large randomness bit rates for the added
SDI security. Indeed, the importance of our SDI protocol’s
security is starkly illustrated by the final and initial input
powers for which no min-entropy is assigned as opposed to
the device-dependent model HDDminðXjEÞ.
B. Real-time random number extraction
The real-time extraction of random numbers is per-
formed with a dedicated postprocessing printed circuit
board (PCB) whose content and functioning are both
thoroughly detailed in Appendix F. Here, instead of using
an oscilloscope to read the measurements output by the
various detectors in the setup, voltage signals are directly
fed to a b ¼ 12 bits bit-depth ADC (Analog Devices
AD9625) capable of measuring analog inputs up to
3.2 GHz with a sampling rate of FS ¼ 2.5 GS=s as well
as a large ENOB of ΔADC ¼ 9.2 bits. This represents a
substantial improvement with respect to the ADC found in
the oscilloscope used in the characterization measurements
in the previous section.
As a general principle, to maximize a QRNG’s final bit
rate, it is important to use an ADC whose ENOB over bit-
depth ratio ΔADC=b is as large as possible for a given bit
depth b. Indeed, for a fixed number of photons input to the
randomness generation measurement, a large ENOB ΔADC
allows one to maximize the extractable certified min-
entropy per sample κ=m since the noise contribution
intrinsic to the ADC would be minimized. As explained
in Sec. IV, the min-entropy in turn sets the upper limit to the
compression ratio, r ≤ κ=mb. Although the ENOB is often
not taken into account, this argument makes it clear why
one should maximize ΔADC=b rather than solely b. Finally,
the output of the ADC is sent directly to the FPGA (Zynq
Ultrascale þ ZU9EG) in order to carry out hashing.
The real-time hashing of raw data was implemented
using the concurrent pipeline algorithm based on Toeplitz
matrix hashing [45]. The idea of the algorithm is to improve
the speed of postprocessing by decomposing the large
Toeplitz matrix of size h × l into several submatrices of
dimension k × l and then simultaneously performing
matrix multiplication with the raw data. The crucial task
of determining k, the number of rows for the submatrices, is
explained in Appendix F.
To demonstrate our protocol, we ran a real-time random
number extraction experiment in two distinct configura-
tions producing either long or short strings. These address
different real-world applications such as large scale sim-
ulations (e.g., Monte Carlo) for which gigabits of random
numbers are required and standard cryptographic protocols
(e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard) typically employing
random seeds of kilobit lengths. The parameters of both
configurations are summarized in Table I.
For the first configuration, we inserted an optimal input
optical power of 5.8 mWprior to the randomness generation
measurement. The optimizationwas performed such that the
entire data would pass the certification test P with a
probability 1 − ϵc ¼ 99.5%. This yields a certified min-
entropy of HSDIminðXjEÞ ¼ 5.32 bits per sample acquired by
theADCwith a security parameter ϵfail ¼ 1.6 × 10−19. Next,
we downsampled the digitized output of the ADC to
1.55GS/s in order to remove any time correlation. This
stream of bits was then fed to the FPGA for which the
hashing algorithmdescribed abovewas performed at a speed
of Rhash ¼ 193.75 MHz and with a Toeplitz matrix of size
h ¼ 9600 bits and l ¼ 4155 bits. We thus achieved a total
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bit rate of Rd ¼ Rdata × r ¼ 12 × 1.55 × 109 × 41559600 ¼
8.05 Gb=s with an overall composable security of
ϵ ¼ 4.3 × 10−10, thereby generating in real time NS ¼ 1
string of length L ¼ 8.05 × 109 certified and composably
secure quantum random numbersmade of t ¼ 1.9375 × 106
concatenations. Note that given the probability of passing
the test, this obtained bit rate corresponds to a bit rate of
hRi ¼ ð1 − ϵcÞ × Rd ¼ 8.01 Gb=s averaged over many
runs and with the same level of security. In the second
configuration,we took the inverse approach and avoided any
concatenation (i.e., t ¼ 1), allowing for a larger hashing
output length of l ¼ 4210 bits. Every second, this resulted
in NS ¼ 1.9375 × 106 strings of length L ¼ 4.21 kb each
with a composable security of ϵ ¼ 4.8 × 10−10. The
obtained bit rate was thus Rd ¼ 8.16 Gb=s with the same
corresponding average bit rate hRi ¼ 8.16 Gb=s up to two
decimal places. The numbers obtained from both settings
were ultimately found to successfully pass the battery of
NIST tests [46].
This achieves an ultrafast and highly composably secure
QRNG based on commercially available components and
entirely independent of the incoming light source for which
the random numbers are both composably certified and
extracted in real time. To our knowledge, this is the fastest
composably secure QRNG (including device-dependent
implementations) ever reported.
VI. DISCUSSION
We now return to the desiderata previously outlined for
evaluating the usefulness of a QRNG device, namely, level
of security, performance (achievable bit rate), and practi-
cality (ease of implementation, durability, and cost). Our
protocol used cheap and robust off-the-shelf components
that lend themselves to prolonged, high-speed usage and
would be amenable to miniaturization in an integrated
photonic architecture. Utilizing an FPGA, we were able to
implement the necessary hashing operations in real time by
using the pipeline algorithm of Ref. [45] detailed in
Appendix F. Moreoever, we hashed relatively large blocks
which allowed us to extract random numbers at close to the
optimal possible rate given the randomness source.
Another consideration when developing a protocol for
certified randomness is whether such a protocol is com-
posably secure [39,43]. That is, whether the output of the
protocol can then be used as an input to other cryptographic
protocols without compromising the security. For example,
it can be input to a randomness extractor along with a seed
to achieve certified randomness expansion using well-
known techniques [42,44]. Very few implementations
enjoy such composable security proofs in either the
device-dependent [9,37,38] or partially device-independent
case [13]. While there is a device-independent result that
produces random strings that may be composed [6], it is
still unknown whether fully device-independent protocols
are secure under composition of devices without extra
assumptions, e.g., devices are memoryless [47]. It is thus
necessary for the moment to move beyond device inde-
pendence if one desires a fully composably secure protocol.
In terms of security and performance, our work considers
completely general quantum attacks and achieves signifi-
cantly higher bit rates for a given security parameter than
the fastest known source-independent (5 kb=s in Ref. [13]),
measurement-independent (5.7 kb=s in Ref. [12]), semi-
independent (16.5 Mb=s in Ref. [17]), or fully device-
independent protocols (180 b/s in Ref. [6]). The only
directly comparable work which offers a source-indepen-
dent composable security proof is Ref. [13], whose
randomness generation rate we improve upon by more
than 6 orders of magnitude. In fact, our work achieves the
highest composably secure bit rate for any level of device
assumptions, including the fastest device-dependent imple-
mentations [38].
The experimental architectures most similar to ours are a
recent series of papers that involve homodyning the
vacuum [19], or squeezed state [20], or dual homodyning
the vacuum [48], and were claimed to be SDI. Indeed, these
works also achieve impressive rates as high as 17 Gb=s. To
derive an SDI proof, these works apply entropic uncertainty
relations [41,49] that can, in principle, lead to devices for
which randomness can be certified even if the source of
quantum states is completely unknown, provided the
measurements acting on these states are well characterized.
However, for realistic homodyne detectors with finite
range, the corresponding uncertainty relation becomes
trivial and no randomness can be certified [49]. Even in
the case of infinite-range detectors, the modeling of a
photon difference as a quadrature measurement is only
valid in the case where the input photon number is small
with respect to the local oscillator. This problem can be
ameliorated but only at the price of introducing an energy
assumption (similar to the semi-device-independent
TABLE I. Parameters and associated values for the two real-
time random number extraction scenarios implemented here.
Parameters Value
NS Number of output strings 1 1.9375 × 106
h Hashing block size 9600 bits 9600 bits
t Hashes per string 1.9375 × 106 1
m Samples per hash 800 800
κ=m Min-entropy per sample 5.32 bits 5.34 bits
l Hashing output length 4155 bits 4210 bits
ϵfail Sample failure p 1.6 × 10−19 1.1 × 10−10
ϵhash Hashing failure p 9.0 × 10−17 3.8 × 10−10
ϵl Single hashing failure p 2.2 × 10−16 4.8 × 10−10
ϵ Total failure p 4.3 × 10−10 4.8 × 10−10
Rd Data limited bit rate 8.05 Gb/s 8.16 Gb/s
hRi Average bit rate 8.01 Gb/s 8.16 Gb/s
L ϵ-random bits per string 8.05 Gb 4.21 kb
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approach) upon the source, thus jeopardizing the claimed
source independence.
A comparison of the security, assumptions and perfor-
mance of a selection of other works compared to ours can
be found in Table II. This work achieves the fastest
generation of composably secure random numbers (i.e.,
QRNG bit rate) ever reported, including the device-depen-
dent homodyning result of [38], even though the latter
implementation produces a higher QRG bit rate. This
superior QRNG performance stems from the highly effi-
cient postprocessing, thus emphasizing the critical role of
carefully designing state-of-the-art randomness extraction.
A final technical point is that, although the importance of
considering digitization noise via the ENOB of the ADC
has been pointed out previously [19,45], many experiments
fail to take this into account. This key consideration has the
effect of reducing the retrievable min-entropy per sample,
thereby considerably lowering the bit rates reported in the
vast majority of the corresponding literature.
Finally, we turn to a quantitative comparison between this
work andearlier protocols basedonhomodynedetection in the
device-dependent [37,38] and semi-SDI contexts [19,20,48].
Strictly speaking, direct comparison with the semi-SDI pro-
tocols is impossible since these fail to give a composable
security parameter. Also, in practice the achievable rates
depend heavily on many technical constraints such as the
detectornoiseandespecially theeffectivenumberofADCbits.
In Fig. 5, we consider a simpler calculation of themin-entropy
generated in a single round using ideal equipment to compare
the ultimate rates of these different protocols. The security
parameter for the displayed SDI curves is chosen to be ϵfail ¼
10−10 with the honest passing probability chosen as
1 − ϵC ¼ 0.995. For the entropic uncertainty relation (EUR)
protocol, the probability of making a randomness generating
measurementwasset tobepX ¼ 0.9 and thephotonnumberof
the local oscillator used in the homodyne detection was
nLO ¼ 107. Details of the calculations are give inAppendixG.
For certain input states we identify fundamentally differ-
ent scalings in some instances. Although we actually
consider upper bounds on the rates for the device-depen-
dent and semi-SDI schemes, thereby penalizing this work
by comparison, we see dramatically different scalings
between this work and the semi-SDI homodyne scheme.
As can be observed in Fig. 5, if the input state is one half an
entangled two-mode squeezed vacuum state (i.e., a thermal
state) or a coherent state, then the randomness of homodyne
TABLE II. Comparison of randomness generation protocols. DD, device-dependent; sSDI, semi-source-device-
independent; sDI, semi-device-independent; SDI, source-device-independent; DI, device-independent. The asterisk
denotes “not proven secure under composition of devices.”
Work Trustlevel Use of ENOB ϵ QRG bit rate (Mb/s) QRNG bit rate (Mb/s)
Ref. [38] DD No 10−10 10740 8000
Ref. [19] sSDI Yes    1700   
Ref. [20] sSDI No    0.0082   
Ref. [17] sDI Not applicable    16.5   
Ref. [13] SDI Not applicable 10−15 0.005   
Ref. [6] DI Not applicable 10−5 0.000181   
This work SDI Yes 10−10 8211 8050













FIG. 5. Comparison between the conditional min-entropy per
round with various nonvacuum input states for the present SDI
protocol (red), protocols based on homodyning using an entropic
uncertainty relation (EUR) for certification (orange), and device-
dependent (DD) homodyning (green). The curves are plotted for
different types of input states as a function of their mean photon
number. Top: coherent state; bottom: thermal state.
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protocols decreases as a function of the photon number of
the input state, whereas the randomness of the present
protocol monotonically increases. For sufficiently large
photon numbers, this work scales identically to the device-
dependent case, thereby achieving significantly improved
security with only a constant factor reduction in perfor-
mance. Moreover, it should be noticed that for an input
coherent state, the photon number from which this work’s
generated min-entropy surpasses that obtained from the
EUR protocol is relatively small (i.e., n̄ ¼ jαj2 ≈ 2 × 106).
This crossing point and the ensuing advantageous scaling
make this work even more desirable from a realization
point of view since it occurs for a coherent state, the most
practical and hence widely utilized state in experimental
quantum optics. Overall, these key considerations highlight
the fundamental quantitative differences between this work
and traditional homodyne-based protocols.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, we present and experimentally implement an
SDI protocol based on the quantumnature of untrusted light.
Our QRNG achieves both state-of-the-art ultrafast random-
ness generation and real-time random number extraction
with a bit rate ofRd ¼ 8.05 Gb=s while providing a rigorous
and specific security parameter of ϵ ¼ 10−10 for the gen-
erated random numbers with no assumptions on the light
source. There are several avenues for improvement.Ahigher
bandwidth balanced detector for the randomness generation
speed as well as a larger effective bit resolution of the ADC
for the retrievable min-entropy per sample are primary
examples among them. Lastly, the present configuration
could be upgraded by connecting more randomness sources
(say γ > 1 of such sources) to the same FPGA and carrying
out parallel real-time postprocessing. This would achieve an
unparalleled average QRNG bit rate of γ × hRi for the same
level of composable security.
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APPENDIX A: CERTIFIABLE RANDOMNESS OF
IDEAL DIFFERENCE MEASUREMENT
To begin with, consider the randomness generation
measurement of Fig. 1. It consists of a beam splitter
BS0 with reflectivity r0 ¼ 12, an input mode R, a trusted
vacuum fed into the other input mode, and two output
photodetectors A and B performing a difference measure-
ment. It simplifies matters greatly if we can prove that the
potential eavesdropper in charge of our photonic source is
making definite photon number states (i.e., Fock states) for
each round of the protocol. In particular, we would like to
rule out any sophisticated, collective strategy where Eve
sends a complicated state that is entangled across all rounds
of the protocol.
Intuitively, this should be the case because the random-
ness generation measurement for each round is a photon
number difference and can be thought of as a coarse
graining over an initial measurement that is diagonal in
the Fock basis. Here, this is shown by writing out the
POVM directly and the optimality of unentangled Fock
state inputs from Eve’s perspective becomes explicit.
For a single round, the entire process of mixing ρ̂R with a
vacuum ancilla j0i ∈ HV and then making Fock state
projections upon both output ports can be seen as a
POVM on HR, the Hilbert space of ρ̂R. Consider the
probability for detecting nA and nB photons at detectors A
and B. This is given by
pðnA; nBÞ ¼ trfÛBS0ðρ̂R ⊗ j0ih0jÞÛ†BS0ðjnAijnBihnAjhnBjÞg
¼ trRftrVfðρ̂R ⊗ j0ih0jÞÛ†BS0ðjnAijnBihnAjhnBjÞÛBS0gg
¼ trRfρ̂RM̂ðnA; nBÞg; ðA1Þ
where
M̂ðnA; nBÞ ¼ h0jÛ†BS0 jnAijnBihnAjhnBjÛBS0 j0i; ðA2Þ
is the corresponding POVM element in the input state Hilbert space (with the subscript R suppressed for brevity). This
expression is just the evolution of the Fock state projections back through the beam splitter BS0 and projected onto thevacuum
ancilla.Togetanexplicitexpression, it issimpler toswitch totheHeisenbergpicturefor thereversebeamsplitter transformation:

















































p jnA þ nB − j − kiRjjþ kiV: ðA3Þ
Acting on the left with h0j on the ancilla mode implies















where we have substituted in the total photon number
N ≔ nA þ nB. As expected, each POVM element is propor-
tional to a single Fock state of fixed photon number N and
the coefficient can be understood intuitively. Indeed, each of
the N photons can be thought of as individually random-
izing at the beam splitter. The probability for a specific
sequence of paths taken by each photon is 2−N and thus the
probability of observing the POVM element M̂ðnA; nBÞ is
the number of paths such that nA out of N photons could
have been recorded at detector A, which is ðNnAÞ as above.
If we consider the sum measurement, it is just a coarse
graining over the two outcome POVM, summing together
all the elements such that nA þ nB ¼ N. The POVM




M̂ðnA; N − nAÞ: ðA6Þ
Using the fact that
P
n
k¼0ðnkÞ ¼ 2n, we can see that
ẐðNÞ ¼ jNihNjR and it is thus just a photon number
projector as expected.
The randomness generation measurement is another
coarse graining. However, it will turn out to have larger
rank and consequently some randomness for all possible
input states other than the vacuum. Define X ¼ fX̂ðxÞg as
the POVM elements of the randomness generation
measurement corresponding to the cases where













j2nA − xih2nA − xjR;
ðA7Þ













j2nA − jxjih2nA − jxjjR;
ðA8Þ









j2nA − jxjih2nA − jxjjR;
ðA9Þ
for all x.
Note that for x even (odd), then X̂ðxÞ only has support
over even (odd) number states. Clearly, if Eve inputs a
vacuum state, then the difference outcome can be predicted
with certainty as x ¼ 0. However, as pointed out in the
main text, if Alice observes a value N for her sum
measurement, then regardless of the original input, she
performs a projection onto the state jNi and can immedi-
ately calculate the guessing probability of the X measure-
ment pguess ¼ maxxhNjX̂ðxÞjNi from Eq. (A9) and hence
the associated min-entropy. For perfect measurements, this
would guarantee the min-entropy with certainty and in an
SDI manner.
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Now, consider the full setup shown in Fig. 1. We
introduce the certification measurement in mode C which
is done by tapping off a fraction of the completely unknown
incoming light in mode E with a beam splitter BS1 of
reflectivity r1. The input state ρ̂E is mixed with vacuum on
BS1 and the reflected beam in mode C is measured at
detector C while the transmitted beam in mode R is input to
the randomness generation measurement. For simplicity,
we will imagine that the outcome at detector C is also
always given to Eve. Writing the photon number projec-
tions as operators on the input Hilbert spaceHE is the same
calculation as Eq. (A5), except now with a beam splitter of
reflectivity r1 instead of 12. This gives
M̂ðnC; nRÞ ¼
rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
× jnC þ nRihnC þ nRjE; ðA10Þ




rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
× jnC þ nRihnC þ nRjE: ðA11Þ
Given this measurement, one cannot exactly determine
the number of photons in mode R incident onto the
randomizing beam splitter BS0, but one can obtain a lower
bound on the min-entropy of m such measurements except
with some failure probability ϵfail;m. Specifically, we impose
a test P at detector C which is passed if the measured
photon number is greater than a lower threshold n−C.
Upon passing the test P, we certify a lower bound n−R on
the photon number in mode R impinging onto the random-
ness generation measurement. We formally state and prove
this result below.
Theorem 3.—An optical setup consisting of
(i) two trusted vacuum modes
(ii) two beam splitters of reflectivity r0 ¼ 12 and r1
(iii) three ideal photon counting detectors A, B, and C
utilized to perform a certification measurement modeled by
Eq. (A11) with lower threshold n−C and a randomness
generation measurement modeled by Eq. (A9) can be used
as a certified ðm; κ; ϵfail;m; ϵcÞ-randomness generation pro-
tocol as per Definition 1 without making any assumptions
about the photonic source with






































where noptE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1.
Moreover,







rnC1 ð1 − r1Þn−nCn!
nC!ðn − nCÞ!
; ðA14Þ
using a coherent state jαi as an input.
Proof.—Security: The key feature here is the diagonal
nature in the photon number basis of all measurements
performed in the protocol. We first prove a Lemma
regarding such measurements.
Lemma 1.—For an m-round, SDI protocol involving a
measurement Q in each round that is diagonal in the







Q̂ðqÞ ¼ I; ðA15Þ
Eve’s optimal strategy to maximize the probability of a
desired outcome q is to input a pure Fock state jni for
each round. Moreover, this remains true for inputs with
restricted support in the Fock basis.
Proof.—One way to see this is to consider a diagonal-






This operator commutes with the Q measurement and
there is no operational way for Eve (or anyone else) to
distinguish between directly measuring Q or measuring Q
after first applying D̂. As such, we could imagine that we
are in fact always applying D̂ to each run of the protocol
[50]. To start with, since D̂ satisfies the definition of an
entanglement breaking map [51], we may safely conclude
that Eve’s optimal strategy will not include any entangle-
ment as there is no way for such entanglement to be
noticeable. Moreover, if we consider any individual round
of the protocol, we can write its purification as a mode E0
held by Eve (including potentially all the other rounds of
the protocol) in the Schmidt form jΨE0Ei ¼
P
j λjjjiE0 jjiE
(with jji not necessarily the Fock basis) and act D̂ upon it.
This yields









σ̂E0n ⊗ jnihnj; ðA17Þ






jhnjlihjjnijlihjj. This means that
the most general state Eve can effectively prepare for the





where pðnÞ ¼Pj jλjhnjjij2. In other words, the input state
for each run of the protocol is effectively just a mixture of
Fock states (potentially classically correlated between
rounds). Intuitively, one would imagine that the best
strategy for Eve would be to choose a state such that
fjjig is indeed the Fock basis and, moreover, to make pðnÞ
simply a Kronecker delta function at some fixed n.
We can show this as follows. Let pðnÞ be the distri-
bution of the optimal input state that maximizes the
probability of q and fcnðqÞg be the Fock state coef-
ficients for that element as given in Eq. (A15). Then, Eve’s
optimal probability is given by









pðnÞ ¼ cn ; ðA19Þ
where we have defined n as the value that achieves the
maximum. This optimal guessing probability would be
saturated by choosing an input state jni; therefore, the
optimal input state is indeed a pure Fock state.
Note that the result extends straightforwardly to the case
where the input state is restricted to have support only over
a finite range of number states ½n−R; nþR . Let pðnÞ be a
probability distribution over ½n−R; nþR , x be the value of the
most likely POVM element of the difference measurement
given that input state, and cn be the Fock state coefficients
for that element as given in Eq. (A9). Then









pðnÞ ¼ cn :
ðA20Þ
Therefore, the optimal input state is jni with
n ∈ ½n−R; nþR . This result can be independently applied to
each run of the protocol (by including the other rounds in
the purification, Eve has already been granted the option to
utilize a sophisticated collective encoding); hence we can
conclude that Eve’s optimal probability to obtain a string of
outcomes for all m rounds is to choose a single Fock state
for each round. ▪
Given Lemma 1, we now lower bound the min-entropy
under the assumption that Eve’s input state only has support
over number states in the range ½n−R;∞½. Eve’s guess for the
difference measurement outcome will always be just the
outcome of the most likely element of the difference
element defined in Eq. (A9). Thus, if we choose x to
be the most probable outcome of the difference measure-
ment (whatever that might be), then we can immediately
conclude that for input states restricted to have support only
over the range ½n−R;∞½, Eve’s optimal strategy to maximize
the occurrence of x (and hence her guessing probability)
will be to input a number state jni ∈ ½n−R;∞½. In fact, it will






























where in the penultimate line, we used the fact that ðnkÞ is
maximal for k ¼ bn=2c (i.e., x ¼ 0) and monotonically
decreases for greater and smaller values of k, which means
that the smallest allowed x will be optimal. In the final line,
we used that 2−nð nbðnþxÞ=2cÞ decreases monotonically in n.
To see this, first note that for n even bðnþ 1Þ=2c ¼ bn=2c






























Þ! ¼ 12 ðnþ1Þnþ1−n
2





cþ1Þ! ¼ 12 nþ1bn
2
cþ1 ¼ 1 n odd:
ðA22Þ
Substituting this optimal guessing probability into the
definition of the conditional min-entropy gives the expres-
sion in Eq. (A12), where the application of Stirling’s
approximation ð2nn Þ ∼ ð4n=
ffiffiffiffiffi
πn
p Þ as n → ∞ gives the second
line.
Now, we show that provided that in each round the
certification measurement outcome is above a certain
threshold n−C, the input to the randomness generation
measurement is ϵfail;m indistinguishable from a state with
support only over ½n−R;∞½. The worst-case scenario would
be that whenever Eve can distinguish the real state from one
with restricted support, she learns the full measurement
record. We can thus interpret this distinguishing probability
as a lower bound to the failure probability for the whole
protocol.
Specifically, we are interested in the probability where
the certification measurement takes a value which passes
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our test P while simultaneously a smaller than desired
number of photons goes to the randomness generation
measurement, thereby representing a failure of the protocol.
As such, we introduce a failure operator corresponding to
there being n−R or fewer photons in mode R given nC




rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
× jnC þ nRihnC þ nRjE: ðA23Þ
The failure probability for Eve successfully cheating the












It is straightforward to see (and we show it in
Appendix D) that this probability is also explicitly the
probability of passing the test, multiplied by the distin-
guishing probability between the real input to the random-
ness measurement, ρ̂R, and the closest state with support
solely in the range ½n−R;∞½ as one would expect in a
composably secure framework. Since F̂ is once more
diagonal in the photon number basis, we can again apply
Lemma 1 to conclude that Eve’s optimal strategy is







rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnE−nCnE!
nC!ðnE − nCÞ!
: ðA25Þ
The lower limit on nC in the sum comes from the fact that
for nE > n−C þ n−R − 1, the requirement for at least n−C
photons at detector C is superseded by the requirement
that there be less than n−R photons in mode R, which implies
nC > nE − n−R. In fact, we show that Eve’s optimal input is
to send precisely noptE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1 photons. The sum-
mand is a generic binomial distribution,




such that the failure probability in Eq. (25) can be seen as
the complement of the binomial cumulative distribution
function. For a fixed lower limit in the sum, the failure
probability increases monotonically with nE. However,
once nE > n−C þ n−R − 1, the situation is more complicated
because the limits of the sum change as well as the
summand. Indeed, instead of running from n−C to nE, it
will run from n−C þ 1 to nE þ 1 as argued above. We now
show that the difference between successive terms of the
sum for all values nE larger than this threshold is negative
and thus the function is monotonically decreasing in nE.
Hence, it reaches its maximum for noptE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1.
For nE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1, we can write ϵfail for the corre-
sponding successive input Fock states as
ϵfailðnE þ 1Þ − ϵfailðnEÞ ¼
XnEþ1
nC¼n−Cþ1




























þ rnEþ11 − r
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þ rnEþ11 − r
n−C








where we used Pascal’s identity





















in the last line.












2F1ð1; n−C − nE; n−C þ 1;−1Þ; ðA28Þ
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where 2F1 is the hypergeometric function, it can be shown
after some algebra that Eq. (A27) simply reduces to










which is always negative for any n−C. Moreover, Eve adding
extra photons will always result in deleting the lowest term
in the summation in Eq. (A25) so that the failure probability
monotonically decreases for all nE ≥ n−C þ n−R − 1. Thus,
the optimal value for Eve to maximize the failure proba-
bility is the single Fock state with photon number


















where the last line is given by Hoeffding’s inequality which
states that for a binomial distribution Bðr1; nE; kÞ with
n−C ≥ nEr1, one gets
XnE
k¼n−C







Finally, the probability that any one of them rounds fails
is the complement that all of them pass thus
ϵfail;m ¼ 1 − ð1 − ϵfailÞm ≤ 1 − ð1 −mϵfailÞ ¼ mϵfail; ðA32Þ
which is precisely the result stated Eq. (A13), thereby
completing the proof.
Completeness: Substituting in the number state expan-
sion for a coherent state jαi and calculating the probability
for the certification test to pass via Eq. (A23) gives the
desired result expressed in Eq. (A14). ▪
APPENDIX B: MODELING DETECTORS
Here, we remove the idealized assumptions from the
previous section and present a detailed detector model.
1. Finite range of photodetectors
As a first idealization, we shall remove the assumption of
infinite dynamic range for the photodiodes. In fact, the
detectors only respond linearly above and below certain
photon numbers thresholds, namely nmin and nmax. In
reality, as the detectors enter this nonlinear regime, there
will still be quantum randomness in their outcome statis-
tics, but we take the worst-case view and assume that all
states with overly large or small photon numbers will be
mapped with certainty to end bins, thereby yielding no such
randomness. Thus, instead of a sum over all photon number
states, we model a photodetection with L≔ nmax−nminþ 1










This can make quite a difference to the output random-
ness since if Eve either inputs a sufficiently small or large
number of photons, she can be sure that the lower or upper
outcome will occur on detectors A and B, leading to a
difference outcome of 0 with certainty. This can be seen
directly by calculating the difference measurement POVM
elements using finite-range photodetectors as an operator in
Eve’s input Hilbert space as before to find
X̂finðxÞ ¼
	Pnmax
nA¼nminþjxj M̂ðnA; nA − jxjÞ x ≥ 0Pnmax
nA¼nminþjxj M̂ðnA − jxj; nAÞ x < 0;
ðB2Þ
where
M̂ðnA; nBÞ ¼ h0jÛ†BS0N̂ðnAÞ ⊗ N̂ðnBÞÛBS0 j0i: ðB3Þ
For states with an appropriate photon number support, a
difference measurement made using finite-range photo-
detectors will be virtually indistinguishable from the ideal
difference measurement in Eq. (A9). Specifically, if a
number state jni is input to a difference measurement with
two detectors A and B that have linearity ranges ½nmin; nmax
such that nmin ≪ n=2 ≪ nmax, then the probability that
either detector will register a number of photons outside its
linear range will be given by the tails of a binomial
distribution. It can then be checked whether this probability
is smaller than the other failure probabilities in the protocol
(typical realistic values will render it far smaller, i.e.,
10−30000). Alternatively, one can also directly empirically
verify the linear response range ½nDmin; nDmax of a difference
measurement by inputting a known photonic laser source
and observing that the difference variance indeed grows
linearly when the laser’s optical power is increased.
This finite range of the photodetection also applies to the
certification measurement in mode C using a finite-range
detector with linear range ½nCmin; nCmax and LC ¼ nCmax −
nCmin þ 1 possible outcomes. We have











where N̂CðnCÞ is given in Eq. (A11).
Finally, we can also write the failure operator associated
with this certification measurement. It will be similar to the
ideal case in Eq. (A23) except for the end bins. The failure
of the protocol occurs when the test is passed and there are
either too many (more than nþR ) or too few (less than n
−
R)
photons incident onto the difference measurement. We
obtain the following failure operator:





rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!




rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
jnC þ nRihnC þ nRjE

;





rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!




rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
jnC þ nRihnC þ nRjE

;
F̂ðnC; n−R; nþR Þ ¼
Xn−R
nR¼0
rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!




rnC1 ð1 − r1ÞnRðnC þ nRÞ!
nC!nR!
jnC þ nRihnC þ nRjE;
∀ nCmin < nC < nCmax: ðB5Þ
Parenthetically, we note that finite-range considerations
expose a problem with the proposed solution to saturation
attacks found in Ref. [41] within the context of continuous
variable QKD. There, the idea is to tap off a small amount
of the incoming light and measure it via a dual-homodyne
(heterodyne) detection, aborting the protocol if a suffi-
ciently large value of the heterodyne measurement is
observed. While this solves the problem in the limit of
perfect, infinite-range detectors, for any realistic finite-
range detectors, this procedure itself is vulnerable to a
saturation attack. To see this, consider an individual
homodyne detection of one of the two field quadratures:
the incoming signal is mixed with a local oscillator and the
difference between the two detectors’ signals is taken.
However, a sufficiently bright input signal would saturate
each individual detector such that it outputs its maximum
value, meaning that the difference measurement would
result in a (typically small) constant value. Thus, in contrast
to our certification measurement based upon a single
detector, there is no guarantee that a bright input would
result in a large measurement outcome, and therefore
applying a threshold check to a heterodyne detection offers
no protection against high-energy attacks. This again
highlights the importance of rigorously modeling the
trusted devices in a cryptographic setup, as even small
imperfections can completely alter the security of the
protocol.
2. Voltage response and temporal behavior
The next step in our modeling is to take into account the
fact that the detector response is not completely flat over the
time window that makes up one round of the protocol.
Instead, the voltage response decays exponentially in time.
However, using careful spectral filtering, one can enforce
an effectively flat temporal distribution for incoming
photons. Considering this, we show that we can model
the voltage response with a single average conversion
factor α.
In general, the detector response of a photodiode can be
regarded as analogous to an RC circuit where the voltage at
time T is given by







e−τ=RCIðT − τÞdτ; ðB6Þ
where IðT − τÞ is the current generated by the absorbed
photons. However, one cannot take the above equation too
literally since a genuinely continuous time dependence
would correspond to a detector with infinite temporal
resolution. Instead, we model a voltage detector as having
K finite time intervals δt ¼ T=K over which the response is
flat (i.e., the detector cannot resolve temporal differences
smaller than δt). The entire detection over the time window
T can then be regarded as postprocessing of the K
outcomes arising from each of the detection intervals δt.
This resulting POVM has elements of the form
M̂ðnÞ ¼ N̂ðn1Þ ⊗ N̂ðn2Þ    ⊗ N̂ðnKÞ; ðB7Þ
where n ¼ ½n1; n2;…; nK. The voltage response to a
photon arriving at the kth interval is given by a conversion
factor
αk ≔ βe−ðK−kÞBWδt ; ðB8Þ







cn;kðvÞ ¼ δðv − nαTÞ; ðB10Þ
where αT ¼ ½α1;…; αkT and the sum is over all LK
possible values for n.
In principle, this temporal detector response could open
loopholes for Eve to exploit. For example, if she were able
to generate extremely short time pulses, Eve could saturate
individual detectors which would then be heavily damped
in time (due to the exponential term in Eq. (B8)), resulting
in a certification voltage that would appear acceptable even
though there would be no randomness in this case.
However, these temporal attacks can be circumvented
via an appropriate choice of spectral filtering in the
detection process. For transform-limited pulses, a suffi-
ciently narrow spectral filter enforces an effectively flat
temporal distribution for the detected photons. Since the
source in our experiment is extremely narrow band (cw
laser), we can afford to use a correspondingly narrow filter
without altering the detection rates in our actual imple-
mentation. Note that a pulsed system which cannot afford
to be similarly filtered without reducing the resulting count
rates would require a careful analysis of the effects of Eve’s
temporal modulation of the source on the output statistics.
This highlights the importance of considering all relevant
physical degrees of freedom in certified randomness
generation.
Considering our implementation, the voltage response of






where h is Planck’s constant, c is the speed of light, BW is
the detector’s bandwidth, η is its responsitivity (in AW−1)
at the wavelength λ considered, and G is the transimpe-
dence gain.
3. Electronic noise
So far, all measurements have been described without the
presence of detector noise. As outlined in the main text, our
detector’s noise λ is well modeled as being Gaussian with
variance σ2. We want to write down the POVM describing a
voltage measurement over an appropriate basis as para-
metrized by its outcome. Given that the noisy measurement
is still phase insensitive, the POVM elements can be written









Consider the randomness generation measurement.
Since the detector noise terms are taken to be independent
from one another, we can equivalently combine them into a
single overall noise variable λD with variance σ2D ¼ σ2A þ
σ2B (this joint variable is what was determined in practice
during device calibration) that acts to smear out the ideal









with X̂finðxÞ given by Eq. (B2) but effectively by Eq. (A9)
for the photon ranges we will certify.
In addition, the certification measurement’s POVM
accounting for the Gaussian noise characterized by vari-









Finally, for the failure operator associated with the
certification measurement with Gaussian electronic noise,
we have the following:
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F̂ðnC; n−R; nþR Þ;
ðB15Þ
where αC is the voltage conversion factor for the photo-
detector C and σC is the standard deviation of its associated
electronic noise.
For the security analysis later, we will often be interested
in the measurement operators from Eve’s perspective who
always knows the relevant value of λ. This leads to a





















and a failure operator associated with certification voltage
measurement









4. Finite resolution and range of
analog-to-digital converter
In the previous section, we modeled the detectors as
having a finite range but otherwise being perfectly photon
number resolving and convolved with a classical noise
variable subsequently given to the eavesdropper. In fact, the
randomness generation measurement has a finite resolution
which corresponds to an extra coarse graining. Specifically,
the analog-to-digital converter which processes the voltage
signal can only record a certain set range of voltages
½Vmin; Vmax, with all voltages greater or smaller than this
amount registered as results in one of the end bins.
Furthermore, within the range ½Vmin; Vmax, voltages are
only recorded with a finite resolution. Therefore, while an
ideal voltage measurement might have unbounded and
continuous values, a real detector in combination with
an ADC with finite bits of resolution ΔADC outputs
J ¼ 2ΔADC outcomes with corresponding POVM elements





where the integration regions are given by
Ib−ðJ−1Þ=2c ¼ ½−∞; Vmin þ δV½;
Ib−ðJ−1Þ=2þ1c ¼ ½Vmin þ δV; Vmin þ 2δV½;…;
I0 ¼ ½−δV=2; δV=2½;…;
I⌈ðJ−1Þ=2⌉ ¼ ½Vmin þ ðJ − 1ÞδV;∞½; ðB21Þ
and δV ¼ ðVmax − VminÞ=2ΔADC is the effective voltage
resolution induced by ΔADC. Note that b·c and ⌈·⌉ are
the floor and ceiling functions, respectively.
As a result, the coarse-grained noisy difference meas-





The corresponding difference measurement from Eve’s










X ¼ fx∶αDxþ λD ∈ IDj g: ðB24Þ
The certification voltage measurement is recorded by an
ADC with the same resolution and consequently it is still a
J-outcome measurement but over an ADC range ½VCmin;
VCmax and a corresponding voltage resolution δVC ¼
ðVCmax − VCminÞ=2ΔADC . This leads to intervals ICi which






Moreover, the associated failure operator is
V̂σC;ΔADCF ði; n−R; nþR Þ ¼
Z
ICi
V̂σCF ðvC; n−R; nþR ÞdvC: ðB26Þ
For a fixed value of the noise variable λC, we have the
following failure operator from Eve’s perspective:
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V̂ΔADCF ði; n−R; nþR Þ ¼
Z
ICi −λC




F̂ðnC; n−R; nþR Þ; ðB27Þ
where
C ¼ fnC∶αCnC þ λC ∈ ICi g: ðB28Þ
In general, one must be mindful of the interplay between
the conversion from photon number to voltage and the final
voltage resolution. Indeed, if the signal were to experience
strong attenuation (very small α), then the voltage distri-
bution would start to become small with respect to the fixed
voltage resolution and the entropy would decrease. In our
implementation, we carefully kept track of the coarse
graining, thus avoiding such issue.
Before we proceed further, we show in Fig. 6 a schematic
drawing summarizing our detector’s model. The POVMs
present in the figure are those specified in this Appendix.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
In this Appendix, we provide the full security proof for
the more realistic QRG protocol carried out in the experi-
ment. As per the idealized protocol, the proof proceeds in
two steps. First, we calculate the worst-case min-entropy
for a certain class of states, namely those with a limited
support over Fock states. Second, we calculate the failure
probability of the protocol which is the maximum prob-
ability that a state not in that class could have passed the
certification test. We rewrite Theorem 1 given in the main
text and proceed with our proof.
Theorem 4.—An optical setup consisting of
(i) two trusted vacuum modes
(ii) two beam splitters of reflectivity r0 ¼ 12 and r1
(iii) two noisy photodetectors used to make a difference
measurement as described in Eq. (B22)
(iv) a third noisy photodetector used to make a certif-
ication measurement as described in Eq. (B25)
which passes the test P if i falls in a chosen range
½i−; iþ
can be used as a certified ðm; κ; ϵfail;m; ϵcÞ-randomness
generation protocol as per Definition 1 without making
any assumptions about the photonic source with



























with δV ¼ ðVmax − VminÞ=2ΔADC ,
ϵfail;m ≤ mϵfail; ðC3Þ
where
ϵfail ¼ maxfϵ−; ϵþg þ ϵλC ; ðC4Þ
with
FIG. 6. Detector model. Photons from a photonic state ρ̂ impinge onto a photodiode whose linear range and equivalent L photon
projectors are given in Eq. (B1). The photodiode’s voltage response is given by the conversion factor α expressed in Eq. (B8) in general
and Eq. (B11) in our case. This factor incorporates the photodiode’s bandwidth BW, its responsitivity η (in AW−1), and the
transimpedence gain G. Noise characterized by a Gaussian random variable λ is then added onto the voltage, leading to the voltage
POVM in Eq. (B12). Finally, the voltage is discretized by an ADC with effective resolution δV and at a sampling rate FS, yielding the
POVM associated with the measurement of the jth voltage bin expressed in Eq. (B20). Light has been effectively converted from
photons to a digital electrical signal which one can subsequently feed to an FPGA.





























where noptE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1, nþR is set to be the saturating
photon number of the difference measurement, and λ̃ is a
bound on λC, the noise variable of the certification
measurement’s detector, such that jλCj < λ̃ except with
probability ελC.
Moreover,







using a coherent state jαi as an input.
Proof.—Security: Consider the task of guessing the
difference measurement from the perspective of Eve who
knows λD on a shot-by-shot basis, which is given by
Eq. (B23). First, this measurement satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 1 and so Eve’s optimal state is a number state.
Her strategy will be to add λD to the most likely value of the
noiseless difference measurement which, as shown in
Appendix A, is 0 or 1 depending upon whether Eve inputs
an odd or even number of photons. Therefore, Eve’s best
guess will be the voltage bin IDj with j ¼ bλD=δV⌉ or
j ¼ bð1þ λDÞ=δV⌉, where b:⌉ is the nearest integer round-
ing function. The guessing probability is given by the sum
of all the probabilities associated with the outcomes X̂ðxÞ
for which Eve’s guess would remain true. This can be
expressed as the following set:
X ¼ fx ∈ ½−ðL − 1Þ; L − 1∶αDxþ λD ∈ IDj g: ðC7Þ








where again the sum only includes even (odd) values of x
when n is even (odd).
From the expressions above, the interplay between the
voltage conversion factor αD and the voltage resolution δV
becomes clear. The number of difference measurement
elements that will be mapped to a given voltage bin is given
by ⌈δV=αD⌉, such that as αD becomes smaller, this number
grows and Eve’s guessing probability will increase. Since
we will only consider number states within the linear
regime of the difference measurement (i.e., nþR ¼ nmax), we
can safely assert that hnjX̂ðxÞjni ¼ 2−nð nbnþx
2
cÞ is a binomial
distribution. Thus, the largest guessing probability for a
given n will occur when λD is such that the ⌈δV=αD⌉ bins
are centered evenly around the origin, i.e., the middle
portion of the binomial distribution. Moreover, we know
from Appendix A that the guessing probability will















which is exactly Eq. (C1). While this expression can be
directly evaluated numerically, for large n−R (recall here that
n−R > 10
5), one can use the Gaussian distribution as an
excellent approximation for the binomial distribution and























The failure probability for the protocol is given by the
probability of passing the test even though a state with too
few, or too many, photons is incident onto the difference
measurement in mode R. We can express the probability of
Eve successfully cheating in a single round as
ϵfail ¼ max
ρ̂E






















where in the last line we used the fact that V̂F satisfies the
conditions of Lemma 1, implying that Eve’s optimal input
state will be a number state.
To begin with, let us consider this probability given a
particular value for λC, the detector’s noise variable.
Then, from Eve’s perspective, this electronic noise λC is
effectively removed as expressed in Eq. (B27) and
we have
































Bðr1; nE; nCÞ þ
XnE
nR¼maxfnþR ;nE−ðnþCþ1Þg




where n−C ¼ minnCfnC∶αCnC þ λC ∈ IC½i−;iþg and
nþC ¼ maxnCfnC∶αCnC þ λC ∈ IC½i−;iþg, with IC½i−;iþ being
the entire voltage range for which the test P is passed.
Let vi ¼ δVði 12Þ be the smallest and largest voltages
corresponding to bin i. Therefore, the minimum (maxi-
mum) voltage consistent with passing the test is v−i− (v
þ
iþ).










We can use our knowledge of the detector’s noise
distribution to turn these into worst-case upper and lower
bounds for nþC and n
−
C, respectively. Recalling that λC is
Gaussian with variance σ2C, we can say that except with a
probability

















Next, the varying limits in the sums of Eq. (C12) can be
explained as follows. For the first sum, an unconditional
lower limit is given by n−C. However, for sufficiently large
inputs nE, this requirement is superseded by the constraint
that nR < n−R, which in turn necessitates that nC ≥
nE − ðn−R − 1Þ. The upper limit simply comes from the
fact that if nE < n
þ
C , then the binomial distribution can only
run up to nE. For the second sum, we have an unconditional
constraint nR > n
þ
R ; however again for sufficiently large
nE, the requirement that nC < n−C implies that we must have
nR > nE − ðnþC þ 1Þ. Notice that depending upon the
bounds for nþC and n
−
C, there are certain values of nE for
which the first or second sums may vanish. This turns out to
be the case here (i.e., for our values only one of the sums
will be nonzero at a time).
The first sum in Eq. (C12) will vanish whenever nE >
nþC þ n−R − 1 ≥ (ðvþiþ − λ̃Þ=αC)þ n−R − 1 and the second
when nE < n
þ




þ n−R − 1
⇒ λ̃ ≤ vþiþ − αCðnþR − n−R þ 1Þ; ðC16Þ
it implies that there are no values of nE for which both sums
will be simultaneously nonzero. In our case, this condition
evaluates to
jλ̃j ≤ 1.155: ðC17Þ
We will always be making a much tighter probabilistic
bound on λ̃ such that Eq. (C16) is satisfied at all times.
Substitution in Eq. (C14) indicates that this will be true
except with probability 10−3769921, which is far below the
other failure probabilities that we certify.
Except with probability ϵλC, we can then write the single












Bð1 − r1; nE; nRÞ


≔ max fϵ−; ϵþg: ðC18Þ
The probabilities in Eq. (C18) can be bounded as
follows. Considering, for example, ϵ−, we have











Bðr1; nE; nCÞ: ðC19Þ
This expression is precisely of the form as Eq. (A25)
for which we already know that noptE ¼ n−C þ n−R − 1.
Substituting noptE in Eq. (C19) yields ϵ− as per Eq. (C5).
Similarly, the expression for ϵþ is again the cumulative
tail of a binomial distribution such that via the argument
above, Eve must choose noptE ¼ nþR þ nþC þ 1 to maxi-
mize ϵþ.
Recall that we can interpret ϵ0fail as being the worst-case
scenario—i.e., the maximum over the probabilities of there
being either too few (causing overestimation of the min-
entropy) or too many (leading to detector saturation)
photons—given a fixed value of λC. Finally, the total
failure probability is given by
ϵfail ¼ ϵ0fail þ ϵλC ; ðC20Þ
which is exactly the same as Eq. (C4), thereby completing
the proof.
Completeness: Lastly, the argument for completeness is
the same as that in Appendix A. ▪
The summations in Eq. (C18) are typically difficult to
evaluate in practice. Therefore, we apply Hoeffding’s
bound to the binomial cumulative distribution to bound




½n−C − r1ðn−C þ n−R − 1Þ2

















þ n−R − 1
1
CA; ðC21Þ
provided there exists a n−R such that n
−
R < (ð1 − r1Þ=r1)×























provided there exists nþR > (ð1 − r1Þ=r1)(ðvþiþ − λ̃Þ=αC).
Thus, provided the Hoeffding conditions above are
satisfied, the total failure probability for one round of
the protocol is given by
ϵfail ¼ ϵ0fail þ ϵλC















































APPENDIX D: MATHEMATICAL DETAILS
Composable security for a protocol is frequently defined
in terms of the probability of passing some test ppass, the
distinguishability between the output of a real implemen-
tation conditioned on passing that test ρ̂pass and an ideal
output of the protocol ρ̂ideal. Since quantum state distin-
guishability is precisely captured by the trace distance
Dðρ̂; σ̂Þ ¼ jjρ̂ − σ̂jj1, the security parameter of such a
definition is typically written as ϵfail ≔ ppassDðρ̂pass;













where the failure operators F̂ðnC; n−R; nþR Þ are defined
in Eq. (B5).
This can be interpreted as the joint probability that the
test would be passed in mode C while a photon number
outside the range ½n−R; nþR  was measured for ρ̂passR (the
conditional state in mode R). For completeness, we show
here that ϵfail can equivalently be seen as the probability of
passing the test multiplied by the distinguishability
between ρ̂passR and any state with support solely in the
range ½n−R; nþR . Recall that without loss of generality, we
can take Eve’s input state ρ̂E to be diagonal in the Fock
basis. In this case, ρ̂passR will also be diagonal in the Fock
basis and so will the closest state in the range ½n−R; nþR ,
which we denote σ̂½n−R;nþR . For such diagonal states, the trace
distance simplifies and it is straightforward to show that the
distance Dðρ̂passR ; σ̂½n−R;nþR Þ is just the probability of projec-
ting ρ̂passR onto a Fock state that lies outside ½n−R; nþR . In
other words,
CERTIFIED QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBERS FROM UNTRUSTED … PHYS. REV. X 10, 041048 (2020)
041048-25













However, this probability is precisely the same as the
joint probability of observing too few or too many photons
in mode R while passing the test, renormalized by the
probability of passing the test. The joint probability is
exactly what is given by the failure mode operators in













Comparing Eq. (D3) with Eq. (D1), we find
ϵfail ¼ ppassDðρ̂passR ; σ̂½n−R;nþR Þ; ðD4Þ
which shows that our failure probability can also be
interpreted as the product of ppass and the distinguishing
probability between the conditional output state and an
ideal state (i.e., one that has support solely in the desired
photon number range), as claimed in Appendix A.
APPENDIX E: SOURCE-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT
QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER EXPANSION
The certified SDI QRG protocol either aborts or, except
with some failure probability ϵfail;m, produces an output X
with a min-entropy HminðXjEÞ ≥ κ > 0 with respect to any
third party, even one with complete control over the
photonic source and access to all other environmental
modes. Equivalently, this is the joint probability of simul-
taneously passing the certification test P and producing an
output with less than a specified amount of min-entropy,
expressed as
ppass Pr (HminðXjEÞ < κ) ≤ ϵfail;m: ðE1Þ
However, the final goal of a randomness expansion
protocol is to utilize an initial random seed in order to
generate a much longer bit string that is “ϵ close” (in some
well-chosen metric) to perfectly uniformly distributed and
unpredictable with respect to any third party. This can be
achieved via randomness extraction (also sometimes called
privacy amplification), which is a judiciously chosen
postprocessing of the measurements. We would also like
to be confident that a realistic implementation of the
protocol will succeed with high probability. Without loss
of generality, the output state S of this postprocessing can




PSðsÞjsihsj ⊗ ρ̂sE; ðE2Þ
for which we have the following definition.
Definition 3.—A protocol that outputs a state of the form
in Eq. (E2) is
(i) Security: ϵl secure (or sound) if
ppassDðρ̂SE; τ̂S ⊗ σ̂EÞ ≤ ϵl; ðE3Þ
where ppass is the probability that the certification
test P is passed, Dðρ̂; σ̂Þ ≔ 1
2
jjρ̂ − σ̂jj1 is the trace
distance, and τ̂S is the uniform (i.e., maximally
mixed) state over S. This means that there is no
device or procedure that can distinguish between the
actual protocol and an ideal protocol with proba-
bility higher than ϵs.
(ii) Completeness: ϵc complete (or robust) if there exists
an honest implementation such that 1 − ppass ≤ ϵc.
The properties of the trace norm ensure that randomness
satisfying Definition 3 is composable, which is critical for
cryptographic applications [43].
Particular care must be taken against quantum adversa-
ries to choose an extractor that has provable security when
considering potentially quantum side information. In gen-
eral, quantum-secure randomness extraction can be seen as
a function Ext∶f0; 1gh × f0; 1gd → f0; 1gl that involves
processing a block of size h ¼ mb (the m, b-bit measure-
ment outcomes) along with a random d-bit seed to produce
an l-bit output that is ϵl close to being perfectly random.
Avery attractive choice is two-universal hashing [53] (or
leftover hashing) which is secure against quantum adver-
saries [39,44] and can be implemented efficiently as it
achieves an excellent trade-off between ϵ and l. It should be
noted that this extractor still requires a perfectly random
seed of length d and thus any protocol that makes use of
leftover hashing can technically only be regarded as a
randomness expansion protocol [54,55]. While the length
of the seed must be chosen proportional to m, it only has to
be generated once and can be safely reused to hash
arbitrarily many blocks, meaning that the initial random
seed can be used to generate an unbounded amount of
randomness. This also means that the seed can be hard
coded into the hashing device (for a further discussion and
an explicit implementation, see Ref. [42]). Other quantum-
secure methods, such as the Trevisan extractor, are more
efficient in the length of the required seed. However, this is
a more computationally expensive process and cannot
currently be performed at speeds at which our protocol
can generate raw randomness. Thus, to achieve bit-
generation rates of the same speed as the randomness
generation rates reported here, it seems necessary to
perform randomness extraction via leftover hashing.
We now have the tools to write down the following result
for certified randomness expansion. Although this is
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essentially a repeat of standard techniques (see, e.g.,
Refs. [42,44]) adapted to our specific setup, we state it
as a stand-alone theorem for completeness.
Theorem 5.—A certified SDI ðm; κ; ϵfail;m; ϵcÞ-random-
ness generation protocol as defined in Definition 1 can be
processed with a randomness generation seed of length m
via leftover hashing to produce a certified SDI random
string of length




that is ϵc complete and εl secure, where ϵl ¼ ϵhash þ ϵfail;m
secure.
Proof.—Security: Let X be the variable describing the
measurement outcomes. Recall that the output of the
randomness generation protocol after the measurement
including the potential side information can be written




PXðxÞjxihxj ⊗ ρ̂xE; ðE5Þ
where X is the alphabet of possible measurement outcomes
and ρ̂xE is the state of the eavesdropper given the outcome x.
A randomly chosen leftover hashing function is then
applied to distill a final random string denoted by the




PSðsÞjsihsj ⊗ ρ̂sE: ðE6Þ
We then apply the leftover hash lemma with quantum
side information [44] and its extension to infinite dimen-
sional Hilbert spaces [49,56], which is necessary for our
purposes.
Lemma 2.—Let ρ̂XE be a state of the form in Eq. (E5)
where X is defined over a discrete-valued and finite
alphabet and E is a finite or infinite dimensional system.
If one applies a hashing function drawn at random from a
family of two-universal hash functions that maps X to S and
generates a string of length l, then
Dðρ̂SE; τ̂S ⊗ σ̂EÞ ≤ 2(l−HminðXjEÞ−2)=2; ðE7Þ
where HminðXjEÞ is the conditional smooth min-entropy
(with smoothing parameter ϵ ¼ 0) of the raw measurement
data given Eve’s quantum system.
Comparing the security definitions in Eqs. (E3) and (E7),
we note that with an appropriate choice of l, we can ensure
the security condition is met. In particular, we see that the
smooth min-entropy is a lower bound on the extractable
key length. To get a more exact expression, first notice that
if we choose






for some ϵhash > 0, then the right-hand side of Eq. (E7)
becomes ϵhash=ppass. Then, provided we have definitively
bounded the smooth min-entropy, we will satisfy Eq. (E3)
for any ϵhash > 0. Finally, since log2ðppassÞ < 0, we have






Now, suppose that we are only able to bound the joint
probability of passing the test while outputting a small
smooth min-entropy HminðXjEÞ < κ with a certain prob-
ability ϵfail;m as is the case here. Then, the convexity and
boundedness of the trace distance implies that this string of
length l will be ϵl secure for any security parameter
ϵl ≥ ϵhash þ ϵfail;m; ðE10Þ
if the length is chosen as per Eq. (E4).
Completeness: This follows immediately from the
completeness of the certified randomness generation
protocol. ▪
APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS FOR
THE REAL-TIME EXTRACTION OF CERTIFIED
QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBERS
In order to generate certified random numbers in real
time, the postprocessing was implemented with a high-
performance FPGA (Zynq Ultrascale þ ZU9EG) installed
on the commercially available printed circuit board Zynq
UltraScale þ MPSoC ZCU102 evaluation kit as shown in
Fig. 7. For data acquisition, a 12-bit ADC (Analog Devices
AD9625) is used while being installed on a separate PCB
connected to the FPGA via an FPGA mezzanine card, as
can be seen in the inset of Fig. 7. The evaluation kit
provides several modules for data transmission, including
the cage for small form-factor pluggable modules and a
universal serial bus (USB) 3.0 port. The double data rate
4th generation random access memory (DDR4 RAM)
module required for data testing is also included.
The process described by Fig. 7 is summarized as follows.
The data from the ADC is deserialized with 8 multigigabit
transceivers (8 ×MGT) and reaches the resampling core of
the FPGA where it is resampled to a lower frequency of
1.55 GS/s since the ADC’s sampling rate is larger than the
experiment’s data generation (imposed by the balanced
detector’s bandwidth). Then, the data arrive at a multi-
plexing unit (gray parallelogram) followed by the central
Toeplitz hashingmodule. Toeplitz hashing is realized via the
concurrent pipeline algorithm (detailed in Ref. [45]) with a
clock rate of Rhash ¼ 193.75 MHz. Here, a 9600 × 4155
random Toeplitz matrix initially saved in the FPGA’s
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memory is utilized. Indeed, it is proven in Appendix A of
Ref. [42] that one need not renew the random input seed
used to construct the Toeplitz matrix. Furthermore, for
optimization purposes, the initial large Toeplitz matrix is
evenly decomposed into a series of submatrices which are
multiplied sequentially with the raw input data. These
submatrices have sizes of 96 × 4155, where k ¼ 96 bits
is carefully chosen to be a multiple of both the ADC’s bit
depth b ¼ 12 bits and the hashing block size h ¼ 9600 bits.
Note that the submatrix’s number of rows also corresponds
to the precise number of bits injected into the FPGA board
per time step of the hashing algorithm; i.e., k ¼ ð12 × 1.55×
109Þ=ð193.75 × 106Þ ¼ 96. As a result of this, substrings
of 96 bits from the raw data at each time step are extracted
and thenmultipliedwith a corresponding random 96 × 4155
Toeplitz submatrix, thereby obtaining a single substring of
l ¼ 4155 bits per clock period. The XOR (exclusive or)
logical operation required between pairs of such subsequent
strings of 4155 bits is performed concurrently with multi-
plication steps. Themultiplication of the entire large Toeplitz
matrix with the raw random string of 9600 bits is thus
performed over 9600=96 ¼ 100 time steps, leading to an
overall extraction of 4155 bits for every such procedure
labeled as a single extraction period. Finally, while the
following extraction period commences, the previously
obtained block of hashed data is prepared for the final output.
For validation and debugging purposes, the option of
saving both raw and hashed data in the FPGA’s memory is
implemented such that one may extract them for further
analysis on a PC. Conversely, data can be uploaded to the
FPGA’s memory from an external source (e.g., from an
oscilloscope’s ADC) and then processed by the Toeplitz
hashing extractor in the FPGA.
APPENDIX G: RATE COMPARISON WITH
HOMODYNE PROTOCOLS
In this Appendix, we derive the curves shown in Fig. 5
which compare the rates for this work to those for the
device-dependent homodyning and the semi-SDI protocols
with certification based on an entropic uncertainty relation
[19,20,48]. Strictly speaking, direct comparison with the
EUR protocols is impossible since these fail to give a
composable security parameter. Also, in practice, the
achievable rates depend heavily on many technical con-
straints such as the detector noise and especially the
number of ADC bits. Consequently, we consider a simpler,
idealized calculation of the ultimate rates of these different
protocols and identify fundamentally different scalings in
some instances. Specifically, we calculate the expected
value of the amount of min-entropy generated per round.
1. Device-dependent homodyning
Following Haw et al. [37], we can upper bound the
min-entropy by noting that for arbitrarily many ADC bits
and perfect photon number resolving detectors, the
probability distribution of the photon difference is only
resolution limited by the photon counting measurement
itself and the amplitude of the local oscillator. Specifically,
it is straightforward to show that the photon difference
for an arbitrary input signal mode mixed on a 50∶50
beam splitter with a coherent state jαLOi gives output
FIG. 7. Schematic of the real-time postprocessing board used to generate certified random numbers. The analog signal generated by
the optical setup described in Fig. 2 is digitized by an ADC and then further processed by an FPGA board. Additionally, the number of
bits during each step of the process, along with the inverse duration of each time step, is shown above the various modules in the
schematic. PD, photodiode; ADC, analog-to-digital converter; MGT, multigigabit transceiver; DDR4 RAM, double data rate 4th
generation random access memory; ETH PHY, Ethernet physical layer. Inset: photograph of the actual postprocessing board comprising
the ADC and the FPGA.
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The photon difference is then given by
Î ≔ â†1â1 − â
†
2â2 ¼ â†LOâs þ â†s âLO: ðG1Þ
If the LO (local oscillator) is very bright, then we can
know its quadrature displacement up to an uncertainty that
is very small relative to the displacement’s mean. Moreover
if the LO is very large relative to the photon number of the
input signal, this signal will be very close to a quadrature
measurement of the input signal. Following, e.g., Ref. [57],
one way to see this is to consider a decomposition of the LO
operator âLO ¼ αLO þ δÂLO, where αLO is the mean value
and the operator and δÂLO represents the quantum fluctua-
tions. Taking αLO to be real, we have
Î ¼ αLOx̂s þ δÂ†LOâs þ âsδÂLO: ðG2Þ
If the mean LO amplitude is large with respect to
fluctuations and the amplitude of the signal mode, then
one has Î ≈ αLOx̂s. In the case of ideal detectors that can
distinguish between n and nþ 1 photons, this is equivalent
to measuring the input quadrature with a resolution given
by Δ ¼ 1=αLO (i.e., the rescaling by the LO power). One
can also calculate the variance for an arbitrary signal state
ρ̂s with a coherent state as the LO. Defining the appropriate
expectation value as hÎiαLO ¼ trfÎðρ̂s ⊗ jαLOihαLOjÞg, we
have
VarðÎÞ ¼ hÎ2iαLO − hÎi2αLO
¼ hα2LOâ2s þ n̂LOâsâ†s þ n̂sâLOâ†LO þ α2LOâ†2s i
− α2LOhâsi2 − αLOhâsi2
¼ α2LOðhâ2s þ â†2s i þ 1þ 2nsÞ þ ns − α2LOhx̂si2
¼ nLOVarðx̂sÞ þ ns; ðG3Þ
where we have again taken αLO to be real.
a. Vacuum input
In the device-dependent case where the signal is known
to be vacuum, the rescaled output is a discretized Gaussian
distribution with variance V ¼ 1 and zero mean. If we label
the discretized output with index k, the probability dis-
tribution from the perspective of an eavesdropper (here

















where k ∈ f0;1;2;…g.











and the min-entropy HDDminðXjEÞ ¼ maxkf−log2½pðkjEÞg








where nLO is the mean photon number present in the LO.
b. Coherent state input
This rate as calculated via Eq. (G5) is also unchanged if
the vacuum is replaced by a coherent state since the
variance of coherent states is still unity. However, if the
signal is a large coherent state jαsi, the approximations we
utilized to derive Eq. (G5) no longer hold. The other term in
Eq. (G2) will not remain negligible and the fluctuations
will actually increase. Considering the photon detec-
tions directly, the state after the beam splitter will now
be jðαLO þ αsÞ=
ffiffiffi
2
p i ⊗ jðαLO þ αsÞ=
ffiffiffi
2
p i. The output at
each detector would be described by a Poissonian distri-
bution, which for large photon number will be well
approximated by a Gaussian distribution, as will the photon
difference. The variance is straightforwardly calculated
to be
Vcoh ¼ jαLOj2 þ jαsj2; ðG7Þ




log2½2πðns þ nLOÞ: ðG8Þ
c. Thermal state input
On the other hand, if the vacuum source was instead
replaced by Eve with one half of an entangled two-mode





ð− tanh rÞnjn; ni; ðG9Þ
then the input to the randomness measurement will be a
thermal state with mean photon number n̄ ¼ sinh2ðrÞ
and quadrature variance V ¼ 2n̄þ 1. As the amount of
squeezing—and hence the number of photons in the input
state—increases, the quadrature measurements will start to
become more and more predictable and the min-entropy
will decrease. Eventually, however, for a sufficiently bright
TMSV state, the extra terms in Eq. (G2) become non-
negligible and extra fluctuations will arise such that the
overall entropy will begin to increase again. For all levels of
squeezing, the statistics will be well approximated as being
Gaussian.
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We can get an upper bound for the device-dependent
min-entropy by assuming that Eve makes an x̂ quadrature
measurement on her half of the TMSV state. This would
project the other arm into an x̂-squeezed coherent state with
variance Vx ¼ sechð2rÞ ¼ sechf2½sinh−1ð
ffiffiffī
n





xE, where xE is the out-
come of Eve’s measurement. We can write down Eve’s
conditional guessing probability directly since it would
simply be the same kind of coarse-grained Gaussian
distribution as before with a resolution of 1=α, but now
the variance given by evaluating Eq. (G3) to obtain




p Þg þ n̄: ðG10Þ
The min-entropy is then given by substitution in




log2½2πðnLOVx þ n̄Þ: ðG11Þ
Note that this is an upper bound because we are
calculating the min-entropy that Eve would have about
an individual round of the protocol. In theory, in a protocol
where Eve’s goal was to guess the n-symbol output of an
n-round protocol, she could potentially employ a collective
measurement that might further reduce her uncertainty.
Nevertheless, we will proceed with this device-dependent
upper bound for comparative purposes.
2. Entropic uncertainty relation certified homodyning
In Refs. [19,20,48], the randomness present in the X
quadrature is certified by making measurements in the
conjugate P quadrature basis and exploiting an entropic
uncertainty relation of the form
HEURmin ðXjEÞ ≥ log2ðcÞ −HmaxðPjBÞ; ðG12Þ






In fact, to get the expected value for the min-entropy
generation rate, one should multiply the right-hand side of
Eq. (G12) by the probability pX that a round is used as a
randomness generation round rather than a check round,
and also subtract some randomness used to randomly
switch bases in the future iterations of the protocol
[18,19]. Here, we will set pX ¼ 0.1 as per Ref. [20] and
to get an upper bound for comparison purposes, we
will ignore the random seed term. For discretized homo-
dyne measurements (assuming symmetric quadrature res-
olution Δ), one has that c ¼ ð2π=Δ2Þ, and noting that
HmaxðPjBÞ ≤ HmaxðPÞ, we get









¼ pX½log2ð2πnLOÞ −HmaxðPÞ: ðG13Þ
Using the Jacobi theta functions ϑ3ðz; τÞ ¼P∞
n¼−∞ τn
2
e2niz, we can rewrite Eq. (G5) to directly












Using this formula, we can evaluate the EUR-based
certified randomness rates for the variance appropriate for
each input state, namely the coherent and thermal cases
exposed in Eqs. (G7) and (G10), respectively.
Note that this rate represents an overestimation of the
randomness generated in that we are using the max-entropy
exactly. In practice, this would have to be estimated from
statistics (see Ref. [20] for several estimators) which
would generally result in a lower value for the certified
min-entropy.
3. This work
Here, we compare the device-dependent and EUR-based
rates with our work. In fact, the EUR-based rates cannot be
directly compared because in reality entropic terms should
be empirically bounded in a way that gives composable ϵ
security (i.e., there is a test such that the joint probability of
passing the test while having less than the certified rate
should be less than ϵ). For this idealized calculation, our
rates are given by Theorem 3. Recall that our protocol is
probabilistic, meaning that randomness is only certified
when the test is passed by observing n−C or more photons in
the certification measurement, which will happen with a
probability at least 1 − ϵc. From Theorem 3, we know that
either the test will fail or the min-entropy will be strictly
lower bounded as per Eq. (A12). Putting all of this together,
we can say that the expected min-entropy generated in a





















2½r1ðn−R þ n−C − 1Þ − n−C2
n−R þ n−C − 1

: ðG16Þ
Notice that for the regions of interest in Fig. 5, namely
where this curve surpasses the EUR curves and scales
similarly to the device-dependent case, the inferred photon
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number will be such that the corrective term Oð1=n−RÞ is
negligible. To evaluate this expected min-entropy given a
target value for ϵfail associated with the input states above,
we simply need to calculate what 1 − ϵc will be for a given
threshold n−C. With those in hand, we can solve Eq. (G16)
for the value of n−R that achieves the target ϵfail and then
calculate the corresponding min-entropy via Eq. (G15).
For a coherent state input jαsi, the state going into the
certification measurement will be j ffiffiffiffir1p αsi. For large αs, the
Poissonian photon-number distribution will be well
approximated by a Gaussian distribution and the proba-
bility of observing n−C or more photons will be given by




)þ 1, where n̄C ¼ r1n̄,
with n̄ ¼ jαsj2 the mean photon number of the incoming
coherent state.
Similarly, for a thermal state source, the input to the
certification measurement will be a thermal state with mean
photon number n̄C ¼ r1nth, with nth the mean photon
number of the incoming thermal state. Finally, using the
formula for a geometric series and the photon number
representation of a thermal state, the relationship between
the threshold and the passing probability is given
by 1 − ϵc ¼ 1 − ½1 − (n̄C=ðn̄C þ 1Þ)n−C−1.
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